Detection rules › Splunk

Windows SpeechRuntime COM Hijacking DLL Load

Author
Raven Tait, Splunk
Source
upstream

SpeechRuntime is vulnerable to an attack that allows a user to run code on another user's session remotely and stealthily by exploiting a Windows COM class. When this class is invoked, it launches SpeechRuntime.exe in the context of the currently logged-on user. Because this COM class is susceptible to COM Hijacking, the attacker can alter the registry remotely to point to a malicious DLL. By dropping that DLL on the target system (e.g., via SMB) and triggering the COM object, the attacker causes the malicious DLL to load into SpeechRuntime.exe and executing under the user's context. This detection identifies suspicious DLL loads by SpeechRuntime.exe from outside the expected locations.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Lateral MovementT1021.003 Remote Services: Distributed Component Object Model

Event coverage

ProviderEvent IDTitle
Sysmon7Image loaded

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

search EventCode=7 Image="*SpeechRuntime.exe"

Stage 2: eval

eval ... using (ImageLoaded)

Stage 3: search

search NOT image_loaded_lower="*system32*"

Stage 4: fillnull

fillnull

Stage 5: stats

stats BY Image, ImageLoaded, dest, loaded_file, loaded_file_path, original_file_name, parent_process_name, parent_process_guid, process_exec, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, process_path, service_dll_signature_exists, service_dll_signature_verified, signature, signature_id, user_id, vendor_product

Stage 6: search

search

Stage 7: search

search

Stage 8: search

search `macro`

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts — predicates this rule actively suppresses.

StageFieldKindExcluded values
1image_loaded_lowereq"*system32*"

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
EventCodeeq
  • 7 corpus 35 (splunk 35)
Imageeq
  • "*SpeechRuntime.exe"

Neighbors

Broader alternatives (more inclusive than this rule)

These rules match a superset of what this rule catches. They cover the same events plus more. Use them if you want wider coverage and can absorb more false positives.