Detection rules › Splunk
Windows DLL Side-Loading In Calc
The following analytic detects the loading of the "WindowsCodecs.dll" by calc.exe from a non-standard location This could be indicative of a potential DLL side-loading technique. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify the DLL side-loading activity. In previous versions of the "calc.exe" binary, namely on Windows 7, it was vulnerable to DLL side-loading, where an attacker is able to load an arbitrary DLL named "WindowsCodecs.dll". This technique has been observed in Qakbot malware. This activity is significant as it indicates potential malware execution through a trusted process, which can bypass security controls. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, and escalate privileges within the environment.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | T1574.001 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL |
| Privilege Escalation | T1574.001 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL |
| Defense Evasion | T1574.001 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | 7 | Image loaded |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
search NOT (NOT ImageLoaded IN ("*:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*", "*:\\Windows\\System32\\*", "*:\\Windows\\WinSXS\\*") Image IN ("*:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*", "*:\\Windows\\System32\\*")) EventCode=7 Image="*\\calc.exe" ImageLoaded="*\\WindowsCodecs.dll"
Stage 2: fillnull
fillnull
Stage 3: stats
stats BY Image, ImageLoaded, dest, loaded_file, loaded_file_path, original_file_name, process_exec, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, process_path, service_dll_signature_exists, service_dll_signature_verified, signature, signature_id, user_id, vendor_product
Stage 4: search
search
Stage 5: search
search
Stage 6: search
search `macro`
Exclusions
Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts — predicates this rule actively suppresses.
| Stage | Field | Kind | Excluded values |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | ImageLoaded | in | "*:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*", "*:\\Windows\\System32\\*", "*:\\Windows\\WinSXS\\*" |
| 2 | Image | in | "*:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*", "*:\\Windows\\System32\\*" |
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
|
Image | eq |
|
ImageLoaded | eq |
|
ImageLoaded | in |
|
Neighbors
Broader alternatives (more inclusive than this rule)
These rules match a superset of what this rule catches. They cover the same events plus more. Use them if you want wider coverage and can absorb more false positives.
- Windows Remote Access Software BRC4 Loaded Dll (drops 3 filters this rule applies)