Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Defender Threat Detected on Kernel Object Path
The following analytic detects a Windows Defender malware detection or remediation event where the scanned path resolves through the NT object manager namespace (\globalroot). It leverages Windows Defender Operational log EventCodes 1116 and 1117 to identify this activity. In the ShieldBreak exploit, this is how Defender is coerced into hydrating a cloud file placeholder and copying attacker content through a symbolic link chain that ultimately writes into C:\Windows\System32. If confirmed malicious, this activity indicates an attempt to weaponize Windows Defender's own scanning pipeline for local privilege escalation.
Known false positives
- No false positives have been identified at this time. Legitimate Defender scans do not report detections against paths resolved through the NT object manager namespace.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation | |
| Stealth |
Telemetry coverage
Rule body
name: Windows Defender Threat Detected on Kernel Object Path
id: 702631e8-90ce-43db-90fd-cf0228edc8ad
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-08-17'
modification_date: '2026-08-18'
author: Onur Mustafa Erdogan, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |-
The following analytic detects a Windows Defender malware detection or remediation event where the scanned path resolves through the NT object manager namespace (\globalroot\).
It leverages Windows Defender Operational log EventCodes 1116 and 1117 to identify this activity.
In the ShieldBreak exploit, this is how Defender is coerced into hydrating a cloud file placeholder and copying attacker content through a symbolic link chain that ultimately writes into C:\Windows\System32.
If confirmed malicious, this activity indicates an attempt to weaponize Windows Defender's own scanning pipeline for local privilege escalation.
data_source:
- Windows Event Log Defender 1116
- Windows Event Log Defender 1117
search: |-
`ms_defender`
EventCode IN (1116, 1117)
Path="*\\globalroot\\*"
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
values(EventCode) as EventCode
values(Action_Name) as Action_Name
values(Additional_Actions_String) as Additional_Actions_String
values(FWLink) as FWLink
by dvc Detection_User Path Threat_Name Severity_Name Category_Name
| rename dvc as dest, Detection_User as user
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_defender_threat_detected_on_kernel_object_path_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
The following analytic requires collection of Windows Defender Operational logs in either XML or multi-line, via the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows. Ensure the Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational channel is being collected so that EventCode 1116 (detection) and 1117 (remediation) events are ingested.
known_false_positives: |-
No false positives have been identified at this time. Legitimate Defender scans do not report detections against paths resolved through the NT object manager namespace.
references:
- https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/rogueplanet-windows-zero-day
- https://www.threatlocker.com/blog/nightmareeclipse-releases-new-poc-shieldbreak-exploits-same-weakness-as-rogueplanet
finding:
title: Windows Defender reported a detection on a kernel object path $Path$ on $dest$
entity:
field: dest
type: system
score: 50
threat_objects:
- field: Path
type: file_path
analytic_story:
- RoguePlanet
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1068
- T1211
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`ms_defender`
EventCode IN (1116, 1117)
Path="*\\globalroot\\*"
Stage 2: fillnull
| fillnull
Stage 3: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
values(EventCode) as EventCode
values(Action_Name) as Action_Name
values(Additional_Actions_String) as Additional_Actions_String
values(FWLink) as FWLink
by dvc Detection_User Path Threat_Name Severity_Name Category_Name
Stage 4: rename
| rename dvc as dest, Detection_User as user
Stage 5: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 6: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 7: search
| `windows_defender_threat_detected_on_kernel_object_path_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | in |
| field:"EventID" kind:in |
Path | eq |
| field:"Path" kind:eq |