Detection rules › Splunk
Windows ConsoleHost History File Deletion
The following analytic detects the deletion of the ConsoleHost_history.txt file, which stores command history for PowerShell sessions. Attackers may attempt to remove this file to cover their tracks and evade detection during post-exploitation activities. This detection focuses on file deletion commands executed via PowerShell, Command Prompt, or scripting languages that specifically target ConsoleHost_history.txt, typically located at %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt. Identifying such activity can help uncover potential anti-forensic behavior and suspicious administrative actions.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Defense Evasion | T1070.003 Indicator Removal: Clear Command History |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | 23 | FileDelete (File Delete archived) |
| Sysmon | 26 | FileDeleteDetected (File Delete logged) |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
search EventCode IN ("23", "26") TargetFilename="*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\PSReadline\\ConsoleHost_history.txt"
Stage 2: stats
stats BY action, dest, dvc, file_path, file_hash, file_name, file_modify_time, process_name, process_exec, process_id, process_path, user_id, vendor_product, process_guid, signature, signature_id, user
Stage 3: search
search
Stage 4: search
search
Stage 5: search
search `macro`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
EventCode | in |
|
TargetFilename | eq |
|
Neighbors
Often fire together
Rules that target events appearing in the same incident timelines. They pattern-match on adjacent steps of the same TTP, so an alert from one is often paired with alerts from these. Useful for triage context and for assembling chained-detection rules.
Share event IDs (chain-detection candidates)
Rules that observe the same Windows event-ID pairs as this one. If you're authoring a multi-stage / sequence rule that spans these events, these are the existing detections that already cover one or both endpoints.