Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Application Layer Protocol RMS Radmin Tool Namedpipe
The following analytic detects the use of default or publicly known named pipes associated with the RMX remote admin tool. It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify named pipe creation and connection events. This activity is significant as the RMX tool has been abused by adversaries and malware like Azorult to collect data from targeted hosts. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate unauthorized remote administration capabilities, leading to data exfiltration or further compromise of the affected system. Immediate investigation is required to determine the legitimacy of this tool's presence.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Command & Control | T1071 Application Layer Protocol |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | 17 | PipeEvent (Pipe Created) |
| Sysmon | 18 | PipeEvent (Pipe Connected) |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
search EventCode IN (17, 18) EventType IN ("ConnectPipe", "CreatePipe") PipeName IN ("\\RMSPrint*", "\\RManFUSCallbackNotify32", "\\RManFUSServerNotify32")
Stage 2: stats
stats BY dest, dvc, pipe_name, process_exec, process_guid, process_id, process_name, process_path, signature, signature_id, user_id, vendor_product, Image, PipeName
Stage 3: search
search
Stage 4: search
search
Stage 5: search
search `macro`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
EventCode | in |
|
EventType | in |
|
PipeName | in |
|
Neighbors
Often fire together
Rules that target events appearing in the same incident timelines. They pattern-match on adjacent steps of the same TTP, so an alert from one is often paired with alerts from these. Useful for triage context and for assembling chained-detection rules.
Share event IDs (chain-detection candidates)
Rules that observe the same Windows event-ID pairs as this one. If you're authoring a multi-stage / sequence rule that spans these events, these are the existing detections that already cover one or both endpoints.