Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Alternate Data Stream Created Over Local Share
The following analytic detects the creation of an NTFS alternate data stream (ADS) accessed over a local administrative share targeting the loopback address (127.0.0.1). It leverages Windows Security Event Logs with EventCode 5145 to identify this activity. Legitimate local processes access files directly rather than through a local SMB share. This behavior is a hallmark of the ShieldBreak exploit, which abuses a symbolic link swap through a loopback share to redirect a privileged, Defender-driven write into an alternate data stream on a system-owned file, ultimately landing attacker content in C:\Windows\System32. If confirmed malicious, this activity indicates an in-progress local privilege escalation attempt and should be investigated immediately.
Known false positives
- Backup, replication, or file-sync software may occasionally write alternate data streams over administrative shares. Loopback (127.0.0.1) access to a local share is rare for legitimate software, tune by ShareName or src_user as needed for your environment.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth | |
| Lateral Movement |
Telemetry coverage
Rule body
name: Windows Alternate Data Stream Created Over Local Share
id: e974a5c9-cbe9-4b4a-8fba-b55e7dbc8259
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-08-19'
modification_date: '2026-08-19'
author: Onur Mustafa Erdogan, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
The following analytic detects the creation of an NTFS alternate data stream (ADS) accessed over a local administrative share targeting the loopback address (127.0.0.1).
It leverages Windows Security Event Logs with EventCode 5145 to identify this activity.
Legitimate local processes access files directly rather than through a local SMB share.
This behavior is a hallmark of the ShieldBreak exploit, which abuses a symbolic link swap through a loopback share to redirect a privileged, Defender-driven write into an alternate data stream on a system-owned file, ultimately landing attacker content in C:\Windows\System32.
If confirmed malicious, this activity indicates an in-progress local privilege escalation attempt and should be investigated immediately.
data_source:
- Windows Event Log Security 5145
search: |-
`wineventlog_security`
EventCode=5145
IpAddress="127.0.0.1"
ObjectType="File"
| regex RelativeTargetName="(?i)\:\w+$"
| fillnull
| rename IpAddress as dest_ip
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
by dest dest_ip
ShareName ShareLocalPath RelativeTargetName
AccessMask src_user
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_alternate_data_stream_created_over_local_share_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with EventCode 5145 enabled.
The Windows TA is also required.
Enable Object Access auditing (success/failure) for File Share in group policy so that RelativeTargetName and IpAddress are populated.
known_false_positives: |-
Backup, replication, or file-sync software may occasionally write alternate data streams over administrative shares.
Loopback (127.0.0.1) access to a local share is rare for legitimate software, tune by ShareName or src_user as needed for your environment.
references:
- https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/rogueplanet-windows-zero-day
- https://www.threatlocker.com/blog/nightmareeclipse-releases-new-poc-shieldbreak-exploits-same-weakness-as-rogueplanet
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 20
message: An alternate data stream $RelativeTargetName$ was created over a loopback local share on $dest$
threat_objects:
- field: dest
type: system
- field: RelativeTargetName
type: file_path
- field: src_user
type: user
analytic_story:
- RoguePlanet
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1564.004
- T1021.002
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`wineventlog_security`
EventCode=5145
IpAddress="127.0.0.1"
ObjectType="File"
Stage 2: regex
| regex RelativeTargetName="(?i)\:\w+$"
Stage 3: fillnull
| fillnull
Stage 4: rename
| rename IpAddress as dest_ip
Stage 5: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
by dest dest_ip
ShareName ShareLocalPath RelativeTargetName
AccessMask src_user
Stage 6: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 7: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 8: search
| `windows_alternate_data_stream_created_over_local_share_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"5145" |
IpAddress | eq |
| field:"src_ip" kind:eq |
ObjectType | eq |
| field:"ObjectType" kind:eq |
RelativeTargetName | regex_match |
| field:"RelativeTargetName" kind:regex_match |