Detection rules › Splunk
PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection
The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell scripts to load .NET assemblies into memory via reflection, a technique often used in malicious activities such as those by Empire and Cobalt Strike. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze the full command executed. This behavior is significant as it can indicate advanced attack techniques aiming to execute code in memory, bypassing traditional defenses. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, and persistent access within the environment.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
| PowerShell | 4104 | Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal). |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
search EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN ("*.LoadFrom(*", "*.LoadModule(*", "*.LoadWithPartialName*", "*Reflection.Assembly.Load*", "*Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')*", "*Reflection.Assembly]::Load*", "*ReflectionOnlyLoad*", "*UnsafeLoadFrom*")
Stage 2: fillnull
fillnull
Stage 3: stats
stats BY dest, signature, signature_id, user_id, vendor_product, EventID, Guid, Opcode, Name, Path, ProcessID, ScriptBlockId, ScriptBlockText
Stage 4: search
search
Stage 5: search
search
Stage 6: search
search `macro`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
|
ScriptBlockText | in |
|
Neighbors
Broader alternatives (more inclusive than this rule)
These rules match a superset of what this rule catches. They cover the same events plus more. Use them if you want wider coverage and can absorb more false positives.
- Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Invalid Escape Sequences (drops 2 filters this rule applies)
- Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Backtick-Escaped Variable Expansion (drops 2 filters this rule applies)
- Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Character Array Reconstruction (drops 2 filters this rule applies)
- Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Concatenated Dynamic Command Invocation (drops 2 filters this rule applies)
- Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via High Numeric Character Proportion (drops 2 filters this rule applies)
- Potential Dynamic IEX Reconstruction via Environment Variables (drops 2 filters this rule applies)
- Dynamic IEX Reconstruction via Method String Access (drops 2 filters this rule applies)
- PowerShell Obfuscation via Negative Index String Reversal (drops 2 filters this rule applies)
- Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Reverse Keywords (drops 2 filters this rule applies)
- Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via String Concatenation (drops 2 filters this rule applies)
- Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via String Reordering (drops 2 filters this rule applies)
- Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Special Character Overuse (drops 2 filters this rule applies)
- PowerShell 4104 Hunting (drops 1 filter this rule applies)