Detection rules › Splunk
High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share
The following analytic detects a high frequency of file copying or moving within network shares, which may indicate potential data sabotage or exfiltration attempts. It leverages Windows Security Event Logs (EventCode 5145) to monitor access to specific file types and network shares. This activity is significant as it can reveal insider threats attempting to transfer classified or internal files, potentially leading to data breaches or evidence tampering. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could result in unauthorized data access, data loss, or compromised sensitive information.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Exfiltration | T1537 Transfer Data to Cloud Account |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | 5145 | A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access. |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
search AccessMask="0x2" EventCode=5145 ObjectType="File" RelativeTargetName IN ("*.7z", "*.bmp", "*.db", "*.doc", "*.docx", "*.gif", "*.gz", "*.jpg", "*.key", "*.log", "*.pdf", "*.png", "*.ppt", "*.pptx", "*.rar", "*.rtf", "*.tar", "*.txt", "*.xls", "*.xlsx", "*.zip") ShareName IN ("\\\\*\\C$", "\\\\*\\IPC$", "\\\\*\\admin$")
Stage 2: bucket
bucket span=5m _time
Stage 3: stats
stats BY dest, _time, EventCode, src_user, src_ip
Stage 4: eventstats
eventstats avg(numShareName) AS avgShareName, avg(numShareName) AS numSlots BY dest, _time, EventCode, src_user
Stage 5: eval
eval ... using (avgShareName, stdShareName)
Stage 6: eval
eval ... using (avgShareName, upperThreshold)
Stage 7: search
search isOutlier=1
Stage 8: search
search `macro`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
AccessMask | eq |
|
EventCode | eq |
|
ObjectType | eq |
|
RelativeTargetName | in |
|
ShareName | in |
|
isOutlier | eq |
|
Neighbors
Broader alternatives (more inclusive than this rule)
These rules match a superset of what this rule catches. They cover the same events plus more. Use them if you want wider coverage and can absorb more false positives.
- Transferring Files with Credential Data via Network Shares (drops 5 filters this rule applies)