Detection rules › Splunk
GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block
The following analytic detects the execution of the Get-WmiObject cmdlet with the DS_Computer class parameter via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This detection leverages script block text to identify queries targeting domain computers using WMI. Monitoring this activity is crucial as adversaries and Red Teams may use it for Active Directory Discovery and situational awareness. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map out domain computers, facilitating further attacks such as lateral movement or privilege escalation.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Discovery | T1018 Remote System Discovery |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
| PowerShell | 4104 | Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal). |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
search EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText="*Get-WmiObject*" ScriptBlockText="*class ds_computer*" ScriptBlockText="*namespace root\\directory\\ldap*"
Stage 2: fillnull
fillnull
Stage 3: stats
stats BY dest, signature, signature_id, user_id, vendor_product, EventID, Guid, Opcode, Name, Path, ProcessID, ScriptBlockId, ScriptBlockText
Stage 4: search
search
Stage 5: search
search
Stage 6: search
search `macro`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
|
ScriptBlockText | eq |
|
Neighbors
Broader alternatives (more inclusive than this rule)
These rules match a superset of what this rule catches. They cover the same events plus more. Use them if you want wider coverage and can absorb more false positives.
- Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Invalid Escape Sequences (drops 4 filters this rule applies)
- Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Backtick-Escaped Variable Expansion (drops 4 filters this rule applies)
- Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Character Array Reconstruction (drops 4 filters this rule applies)
- Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Concatenated Dynamic Command Invocation (drops 4 filters this rule applies)
- Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via High Numeric Character Proportion (drops 4 filters this rule applies)
- Potential Dynamic IEX Reconstruction via Environment Variables (drops 4 filters this rule applies)
- Dynamic IEX Reconstruction via Method String Access (drops 4 filters this rule applies)
- PowerShell Obfuscation via Negative Index String Reversal (drops 4 filters this rule applies)
- Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Reverse Keywords (drops 4 filters this rule applies)
- Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via String Concatenation (drops 4 filters this rule applies)
- Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via String Reordering (drops 4 filters this rule applies)
- Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Special Character Overuse (drops 4 filters this rule applies)
- PowerShell 4104 Hunting (drops 3 filters this rule applies)