Detection rules › Sigma
Unsigned Binary Loaded From Suspicious Location
Detects Code Integrity (CI) engine blocking processes from loading unsigned DLLs residing in suspicious locations
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | T1574.001 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL |
| Privilege Escalation | T1574.001 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL |
| Defense Evasion | T1574.001 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL |
Event coverage
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: selection
or:
ImageName|contains: 'C:\Windows\TEMP\'
ImageName|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
ImageName|contains: '\Desktop\'
ImageName|contains: '\Downloads\'
ImageName|contains: '\PerfLogs\'
ImageName|contains: '\Users\Public\'
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
ImageName | match |
|
Neighbors
Often fire together
Rules that target events appearing in the same incident timelines. They pattern-match on adjacent steps of the same TTP, so an alert from one is often paired with alerts from these. Useful for triage context and for assembling chained-detection rules.
Share event IDs (chain-detection candidates)
Rules that observe the same Windows event-ID pairs as this one. If you're authoring a multi-stage / sequence rule that spans these events, these are the existing detections that already cover one or both endpoints.