Detection rules › Sigma
Active Directory User Backdoors
Detects scenarios where one can control another users or computers account without having to use their credentials.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | T1098 Account Manipulation |
| Privilege Escalation | T1098 Account Manipulation |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | 4738 | A user account was changed. |
| Security-Auditing | 5136 | A directory service object was modified. |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: selection1
Stage 2: not 1 of filter_*
or:
AllowedToDelegateTo: ''
AllowedToDelegateTo: -
AllowedToDelegateTo: null
Stage 3: 1 of selection_5136_1
AttributeLDAPDisplayName: msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo
Stage 4: 1 of selection_5136_2
AttributeLDAPDisplayName: servicePrincipalName
ObjectClass: user
Stage 5: 1 of selection_5136_3
AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity'
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
AllowedToDelegateTo | eq |
|
AttributeLDAPDisplayName | eq |
|
ObjectClass | eq |
|
Neighbors
Stricter alternatives (narrower than this rule)
The rules below may be useful if you find the current rule is too noisy / lacks specificity.
- Account Configured with Never-Expiring Password (adds 1 filter)
Share event IDs (chain-detection candidates)
Rules that observe the same Windows event-ID pairs as this one. If you're authoring a multi-stage / sequence rule that spans these events, these are the existing detections that already cover one or both endpoints.