ServiceDll Hijack

Severity: medium
Author: frack113
Source: upstream

Detects changes to the "ServiceDLL" value related to a service in the registry. This is often used as a method of persistence.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Persistence	`T1543.003` Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
Privilege Escalation	`T1543.003` Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service

Event coverage

Provider	Event ID	Title
Sysmon	13	RegistryEvent (Value Set)

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `selection`

TargetObject|endswith: '\Parameters\ServiceDll'
TargetObject|contains: ControlSet
TargetObject|contains: '\Services\'
TargetObject|contains: '\System\'

Stage 2: `not 1 of filter_main_*`

or:
Details: '%%systemroot%%\system32\ntdsa.dll'
Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe'
TargetObject|endswith: '\Services\NTDS\Parameters\ServiceDll'
Details: 'C:\Windows\system32\spool\drivers\x64\3\PrintConfig.dll'
Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe'

Stage 3: `not 1 of filter_optional_safetica`

Details: 'C:\Windows\System32\STAgent.dll'
Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`Details`	eq	`%%systemroot%%\system32\ntdsa.dll` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `C:\Windows\System32\STAgent.dll` `C:\Windows\system32\spool\drivers\x64\3\PrintConfig.dll`
`Image`	ends_with	`\regsvr32.exe` corpus 57 (sigma 57)
`Image`	eq	`C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe` corpus 7 (sigma 7) `C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe` corpus 2 (sigma 2)
`TargetObject`	ends_with	`\Parameters\ServiceDll` `\Services\NTDS\Parameters\ServiceDll`
`TargetObject`	match	`ControlSet` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `\Services\` corpus 3 (sigma 3) `\System\`