Renamed ProcDump Execution

Severity: high
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
Source: upstream

Detects the execution of a renamed ProcDump executable. This often done by attackers or malware in order to evade defensive mechanisms.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Defense Evasion	`T1036.003` Masquerading: Rename Legitimate Utilities

Event coverage

Provider	Event ID	Title
Sysmon	1	Process creation

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `selection_ofn`

OriginalFileName: procdump

Stage 2: `all of selection_cli_dump_flag`

or:
CommandLine|contains: ' -ma '
CommandLine|contains: ' -mp '

Stage 3: `all of selection_cli_eula_flag`

CommandLine|contains: ' /accepteula'

Stage 4: `not 1 of filter_main_known_names`

or:
Image|endswith: '\procdump.exe'
Image|endswith: '\procdump64.exe'

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`CommandLine`	match	`-ma` corpus 4 (sigma 4) `-mp` corpus 3 (sigma 3) `/accepteula`
`Image`	ends_with	`\procdump.exe` corpus 6 (sigma 6) `\procdump64.exe` corpus 5 (sigma 5)
`OriginalFileName`	eq	`procdump` corpus 2 (sigma 2)

Renamed ProcDump Execution

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: selection_ofn

Stage 2: all of selection_cli_dump_flag

Stage 3: all of selection_cli_eula_flag

Stage 4: not 1 of filter_main_known_names

Indicators

Stage 1: `selection_ofn`

Stage 2: `all of selection_cli_dump_flag`

Stage 3: `all of selection_cli_eula_flag`

Stage 4: `not 1 of filter_main_known_names`