Powershell Empire Cmdlets Executed in Command Line

Status: available
Severity: medium
Time window: 12h
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

This query identifies use of PowerShell Empire's cmdlets within the command line data of the PowerShell process, indicating potential use of the post-exploitation tool.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Execution	`T1047` Windows Management Instrumentation, `T1053.005` Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, `T1059.001` Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, `T1059.003` Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, `T1106` Native API, `T1127.001` Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution: MSBuild, `T1569.002` System Services: Service Execution, `T1574.001` Hijack Execution Flow: DLL, `T1574.004` Hijack Execution Flow: Dylib Hijacking, `T1574.007` Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable, `T1574.008` Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking, `T1574.009` Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by Unquoted Path
Persistence	`T1053.005` Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, `T1136.001` Create Account: Local Account, `T1136.002` Create Account: Domain Account, `T1543.003` Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, `T1546.008` Event Triggered Execution: Accessibility Features, `T1547.001` Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, `T1547.005` Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Security Support Provider, `T1547.009` Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Shortcut Modification
Privilege Escalation	`T1053.005` Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, `T1055` Process Injection, `T1068` Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, `T1134.002` Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token, `T1134.005` Access Token Manipulation: SID-History Injection, `T1484.001` Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification, `T1543.003` Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, `T1546.008` Event Triggered Execution: Accessibility Features, `T1547.001` Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, `T1547.005` Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Security Support Provider, `T1547.009` Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Shortcut Modification, `T1548.002` Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control
Stealth	`T1027` Obfuscated Files or Information, `T1055` Process Injection, `T1070.006` Indicator Removal: Timestomp, `T1127.001` Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution: MSBuild, `T1134.002` Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token, `T1134.005` Access Token Manipulation: SID-History Injection, `T1574.001` Hijack Execution Flow: DLL, `T1574.004` Hijack Execution Flow: Dylib Hijacking, `T1574.007` Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable, `T1574.008` Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking, `T1574.009` Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by Unquoted Path
Credential Access	`T1003.001` OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, `T1040` Network Sniffing, `T1056.001` Input Capture: Keylogging, `T1056.004` Input Capture: Credential API Hooking, `T1552.001` Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files, `T1552.004` Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys, `T1555.003` Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers, `T1557.001` Adversary-in-the-Middle: Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay, `T1558.002` Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Silver Ticket, `T1558.003` Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting
Discovery	`T1016` System Network Configuration Discovery, `T1040` Network Sniffing, `T1046` Network Service Discovery, `T1049` System Network Connections Discovery, `T1057` Process Discovery, `T1082` System Information Discovery, `T1083` File and Directory Discovery, `T1087.001` Account Discovery: Local Account, `T1087.002` Account Discovery: Domain Account, `T1135` Network Share Discovery, `T1217` Browser Information Discovery, `T1482` Domain Trust Discovery, `T1518.001` Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery, `T1615` Group Policy Discovery
Lateral Movement	`T1021.003` Remote Services: Distributed Component Object Model, `T1021.004` Remote Services: SSH, `T1210` Exploitation of Remote Services, `T1550.002` Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash
Collection	`T1056.001` Input Capture: Keylogging, `T1056.004` Input Capture: Credential API Hooking, `T1113` Screen Capture, `T1114.001` Email Collection: Local Email Collection, `T1115` Clipboard Data, `T1125` Video Capture, `T1557.001` Adversary-in-the-Middle: Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay, `T1560` Archive Collected Data
Command & Control	`T1071.001` Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, `T1102.002` Web Service: Bidirectional Communication, `T1105` Ingress Tool Transfer, `T1573.002` Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography
Exfiltration	`T1041` Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, `T1567.001` Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Code Repository, `T1567.002` Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4688	A new process has been created.

Rule body kusto

id: ef88eb96-861c-43a0-ab16-f3835a97c928
name: Powershell Empire Cmdlets Executed in Command Line
description: |
  'This query identifies use of PowerShell Empire's cmdlets within the command line data of the PowerShell process, indicating potential use of the post-exploitation tool.'
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: SecurityEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityEvent
  - connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityEvent
  - connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityEvents
  - connectorId: WindowsForwardedEvents
    dataTypes:
      - WindowsEvent
queryFrequency: 12h
queryPeriod: 12h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Collection
  - CommandAndControl
  - CredentialAccess
  - DefenseEvasion
  - Discovery
  - Execution
  - Exfiltration
  - LateralMovement
  - Persistence
  - PrivilegeEscalation
relevantTechniques:
  - T1548.002
  - T1134
  - T1134.002
  - T1134.005
  - T1087.001
  - T1087.002
  - T1557.001
  - T1071.001
  - T1560
  - T1547.001
  - T1547.005
  - T1547.009
  - T1217
  - T1115
  - T1059
  - T1059.001
  - T1059.003
  - T1136.001
  - T1136.002
  - T1543.003
  - T1555.003
  - T1484.001
  - T1482
  - T1114.001
  - T1573.002
  - T1546.008
  - T1041
  - T1567.001
  - T1567.002
  - T1068
  - T1210
  - T1083
  - T1615
  - T1574.001
  - T1574.004
  - T1574.007
  - T1574.008
  - T1574.009
  - T1070.006
  - T1105
  - T1056.001
  - T1056.004
  - T1106
  - T1046
  - T1135
  - T1040
  - T1027
  - T1003.001
  - T1057
  - T1055
  - T1021.003
  - T1021.004
  - T1053.005
  - T1113
  - T1518.001
  - T1558.002
  - T1558.003
  - T1082
  - T1016
  - T1049
  - T1569.002
  - T1127.001
  - T1552.001
  - T1552.004
  - T1550.002
  - T1125
  - T1102.002
  - T1047
query: |
  let regexEmpire = tostring(toscalar(externaldata(cmdlets:string)[@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/EmpireCommandString.txt"] with (format="txt")));
  (union isfuzzy=true
   (SecurityEvent
  | where EventID == 4688
  //consider filtering on filename if perf issues occur
  //where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","powershell_ise.exe","pwsh.exe")
  | where not(ParentProcessName has_any ('gc_worker.exe', 'gc_service.exe'))
  | where CommandLine has "-encodedCommand"
  | parse kind=regex flags=i CommandLine with * "-EncodedCommand " encodedCommand
  | extend encodedCommand = iff(encodedCommand has " ", tostring(split(encodedCommand, " ")[0]), encodedCommand)
  // Note: currently the base64_decode_tostring function is limited to supporting UTF8
  | extend decodedCommand = translate('\0','', base64_decode_tostring(substring(encodedCommand, 0, strlen(encodedCommand) -  (strlen(encodedCommand) %8)))), encodedCommand, CommandLine , strlen(encodedCommand)
  | extend EfectiveCommand = iff(isnotempty(encodedCommand), decodedCommand, CommandLine)
  | where EfectiveCommand matches regex regexEmpire
  | project timestamp = TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, FileName = Process, EfectiveCommand, decodedCommand, encodedCommand, CommandLine, ParentProcessName
  | extend HostName = split(Computer, '.', 0)[0], DnsDomain = strcat_array(array_slice(split(Computer, '.'), 1, -1), '.')
  ),
  (WindowsEvent
  | where EventID == 4688
  | where EventData has_any ("-encodedCommand", "powershell.exe","powershell_ise.exe","pwsh.exe")
  | where not(EventData has_any ('gc_worker.exe', 'gc_service.exe'))
  //consider filtering on filename if perf issues occur
  //extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)
  //extend Process=tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\')[-1])
  //FileName = Process
  //where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","powershell_ise.exe","pwsh.exe")
  | extend ParentProcessName = tostring(EventData.ParentProcessName)
  | where not(ParentProcessName has_any ('gc_worker.exe', 'gc_service.exe'))
  | extend CommandLine = tostring(EventData.CommandLine)
  | where CommandLine has "-encodedCommand"
  | parse kind=regex flags=i CommandLine with * "-EncodedCommand " encodedCommand
  | extend encodedCommand = iff(encodedCommand has " ", tostring(split(encodedCommand, " ")[0]), encodedCommand)
  // Note: currently the base64_decode_tostring function is limited to supporting UTF8
  | extend decodedCommand = translate('\0','', base64_decode_tostring(substring(encodedCommand, 0, strlen(encodedCommand) -  (strlen(encodedCommand) %8)))), encodedCommand, CommandLine , strlen(encodedCommand)
  | extend EfectiveCommand = iff(isnotempty(encodedCommand), decodedCommand, CommandLine)
  | where EfectiveCommand matches regex regexEmpire
  | extend SubjectUserName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName)
  | extend SubjectDomainName = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName)
  | extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)
  | extend Process=tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\')[-1])
  | project timestamp = TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, FileName = Process, EfectiveCommand, decodedCommand, encodedCommand, CommandLine, ParentProcessName
  | extend HostName = split(Computer, '.', 0)[0], DnsDomain = strcat_array(array_slice(split(Computer, '.'), 1, -1), '.')
  ))
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: SubjectUserName
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: SubjectDomainName
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: DnsDomain
        columnName: DnsDomain
version: 1.3.1
kind: Scheduled

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `let`

let regexEmpire = tostring(toscalar(externaldata(cmdlets:string)[@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/EmpireCommandString.txt"] with (format="txt")));

Stage 1: `union`

union isfuzzy=true

Stage 2: `source` time_window=43200s

SecurityEvent

Stage 3: `where`

| where EventID == 4688

Stage 4: `where`

| where not(ParentProcessName has_any ('gc_worker.exe', 'gc_service.exe'))

Stage 5: `where`

| where CommandLine has "-encodedCommand"

Stage 6: `parse`

| parse kind=regex flags=i CommandLine with * "-EncodedCommand " encodedCommand

Stage 7: `extend`

| extend encodedCommand = iff(encodedCommand has " ", tostring(split(encodedCommand, " ")[0]), encodedCommand)

Stage 8: `extend`

| extend decodedCommand = translate('\0','', base64_decode_tostring(substring(encodedCommand, 0, strlen(encodedCommand) -  (strlen(encodedCommand) %8)))), encodedCommand, CommandLine , strlen(encodedCommand)

Stage 9: `extend`

| extend EfectiveCommand = iff(isnotempty(encodedCommand), decodedCommand, CommandLine)

Stage 10: `where`

| where EfectiveCommand matches regex regexEmpire

Stage 11: `project`

| project timestamp = TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, FileName = Process, EfectiveCommand, decodedCommand, encodedCommand, CommandLine, ParentProcessName

Stage 12: `extend`

| extend HostName = split(Computer, '.', 0)[0], DnsDomain = strcat_array(array_slice(split(Computer, '.'), 1, -1), '.')

Stage 13: `source`

WindowsEvent

Stage 14: `where`

| where EventID == 4688

Stage 15: `where`

| where EventData has_any ("-encodedCommand", "powershell.exe","powershell_ise.exe","pwsh.exe")

Stage 16: `where`

| where not(EventData has_any ('gc_worker.exe', 'gc_service.exe'))

Stage 17: `extend`

| extend ParentProcessName = tostring(EventData.ParentProcessName)

Stage 18: `where`

| where not(ParentProcessName has_any ('gc_worker.exe', 'gc_service.exe'))

Stage 19: `extend`

| extend CommandLine = tostring(EventData.CommandLine)

Stage 20: `where`

| where CommandLine has "-encodedCommand"

Stage 21: `parse`

| parse kind=regex flags=i CommandLine with * "-EncodedCommand " encodedCommand

Stage 22: `extend`

| extend encodedCommand = iff(encodedCommand has " ", tostring(split(encodedCommand, " ")[0]), encodedCommand)

Stage 23: `extend`

| extend decodedCommand = translate('\0','', base64_decode_tostring(substring(encodedCommand, 0, strlen(encodedCommand) -  (strlen(encodedCommand) %8)))), encodedCommand, CommandLine , strlen(encodedCommand)

Stage 24: `extend`

| extend EfectiveCommand = iff(isnotempty(encodedCommand), decodedCommand, CommandLine)

Stage 25: `where`

| where EfectiveCommand matches regex regexEmpire

Stage 26: `extend`

| extend SubjectUserName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName)

Stage 27: `extend`

| extend SubjectDomainName = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName)

Stage 28: `extend`

| extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)

Stage 29: `extend`

| extend Process=tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\')[-1])

Stage 30: `project`

| project timestamp = TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, FileName = Process, EfectiveCommand, decodedCommand, encodedCommand, CommandLine, ParentProcessName

Stage 31: `extend`

| extend HostName = split(Computer, '.', 0)[0], DnsDomain = strcat_array(array_slice(split(Computer, '.'), 1, -1), '.')

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Stage	Field	Kind	Excluded values
4	`ParentProcessName`	match	`gc_worker.exe`, `gc_service.exe`
16	`EventData`	match	`gc_worker.exe`, `gc_service.exe`
18	`ParentProcessName`	match	`gc_worker.exe`, `gc_service.exe`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`CommandLine`	match	`-encodedCommand` corpus 3 (sigma 1, elastic 1, kusto 1)
`EfectiveCommand`	regex_match	`regexEmpire`
`EventData`	match	`-encodedCommand` `powershell.exe` `powershell_ise.exe` `pwsh.exe`
`EventID`	eq	`4688` transforms: `cased` corpus 312 (splunk 283, kusto 29)

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`CommandLine`	`project`
`Computer`	`project`
`EfectiveCommand`	`project`
`FileName`	`project`
`ParentProcessName`	`project`
`SubjectDomainName`	`project`
`SubjectUserName`	`project`
`decodedCommand`	`project`
`encodedCommand`	`project`
`timestamp`	`project`
`DnsDomain`	`extend`
`HostName`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Powershell Empire Cmdlets Executed in Command Line

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: let

Stage 1: union

Stage 2: source time_window=43200s

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: where

Stage 6: parse

Stage 7: extend

Stage 8: extend

Stage 9: extend

Stage 10: where

Stage 11: project

Stage 12: extend

Stage 13: source

Stage 14: where

Stage 15: where

Stage 16: where

Stage 17: extend

Stage 18: where

Stage 19: extend

Stage 20: where

Stage 21: parse

Stage 22: extend

Stage 23: extend

Stage 24: extend

Stage 25: where

Stage 26: extend

Stage 27: extend

Stage 28: extend

Stage 29: extend

Stage 30: project

Stage 31: extend