Zinc Actor IOCs files - October 2022

Status: available
Severity: high
Time window: 6h
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

Identifies a match across filename and commandline IOC's related to an actor tracked by Microsoft as Zinc. Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/29/zinc-weaponizing-open-source-software/

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Persistence	`T1546` Event Triggered Execution

Event coverage

Provider	Event/ActionType	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 1	Process creation
Sysmon	Event ID 3	Network connection
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4688	A new process has been created.
Security-Auditing	Event ID 5156	The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a connection.
Defender-DeviceNetworkEvents	any	Network activity (any)

Rule body kusto

id: 9a7f6651-801b-491c-a548-8b454b356eaa
name: Zinc Actor IOCs files - October 2022
description: | 
  'Identifies a match across filename and commandline IOC's related to an actor tracked by Microsoft as Zinc.
  Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/29/zinc-weaponizing-open-source-software/'
severity: High 
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:                
  - connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
    dataTypes:
      - DeviceNetworkEvents
      - DeviceFileEvents
      - DeviceEvents
      - DeviceProcessEvents
  - connectorId: SecurityEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityEvent
  - connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
    dataTypes: 
      - SecurityEvents          
queryFrequency: 6h 
queryPeriod: 6h 
triggerOperator: gt 
triggerThreshold: 0 
tactics: 
  - Persistence
relevantTechniques:
  - T1546
tags:
  - Zinc
query:  |
  let iocs = externaldata(DateAdded:string,IoC:string,Type:string) [@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/ZincOctober2022IOCs.csv"] with (format="csv", ignoreFirstRecord=True);
  let file_path = (iocs | where Type =~ "filepath" | project IoC);
  let commandline = (iocs | where Type =~ "commandline" | project IoC);
  (union isfuzzy=true 
  (DeviceNetworkEvents
  | where  InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (file_path) or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (commandline)
  | project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, LocalIP, Type
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = DeviceName
  ),
  (Event
  | where Source =~ "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
  | where EventID == 1
  | extend EvData = parse_xml(EventData)
  | extend EventDetail = EvData.DataItem.EventData.Data
  | extend Image = EventDetail.[4].["#text"],  CommandLine = EventDetail.[10].["#text"]
  | where Image has_any (file_path)  or   CommandLine has_any (commandline)
  | project TimeGenerated, EventDetail, UserName, Computer, Type, Source, CommandLine, Image
  | extend Type = strcat(Type, ": ", Source)
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = Computer , AccountEntity = UserName, ProcessEntity = tostring(split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1])
  ),  
  (DeviceProcessEvents
  | where  ( InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (file_path)) or ( InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (commandline))  or (InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (file_path)) or (InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (commandline)) or (FolderPath  has_any (file_path)) or (FolderPath has_any (commandline))
  | project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, FolderPath, Type
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = DeviceName , AccountEntity = InitiatingProcessAccountName, ProcessEntity = InitiatingProcessFileName
  ),
  (DeviceFileEvents
  | where  (InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (file_path)) or (InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (commandline)) or (FolderPath  has_any (file_path)) or (FolderPath  has_any (commandline)) or ( InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (commandline)) or ( InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (file_path))
  | project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RequestAccountName, RequestSourceIP, InitiatingProcessSHA256, FolderPath, Type
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = DeviceName , AccountEntity = RequestAccountName, ProcessEntity = InitiatingProcessFileName, AlgorithmEntity = "SHA256", FileHashEntity = InitiatingProcessSHA256
  ),
  (DeviceEvents
  | where  ( InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (file_path)) or ( InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (commandline)) or (InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (file_path)) or (InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (commandline)) or (FolderPath  has_any (file_path)) or (FolderPath has_any (commandline))
  | project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, Type
  | extend CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = DeviceName , AccountEntity = InitiatingProcessAccountName, ProcessEntity = InitiatingProcessFileName
  ),
  (SecurityEvent
  | where EventID == 4688
  | where ( CommandLine has_any (file_path)) or ( CommandLine has_any (commandline))  or (NewProcessName has_any (file_path)) or (NewProcessName has_any (commandline)) or (ParentProcessName has_any (file_path)) or (ParentProcessName has_any (commandline))
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer, NewProcessName, ParentProcessName, Account, NewProcessId, Type
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = Computer , AccountEntity = Account, ProcessEntity = NewProcessName
  )
  )
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(HostEntity, '.', 0)[0]), DnsDomain = tostring(strcat_array(array_slice(split(HostEntity, '.'), 1, -1), '.'))
  | extend Name = tostring(split(AccountEntity, '@', 0)[0]), UPNSuffix = tostring(split(AccountEntity, '@', 1)[0])
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: Name
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: UPNSuffix
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: DnsDomain
        columnName: DnsDomain
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: RemoteIP 
  - entityType: Process
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: ProcessId
        columnName: ProcessEntity
  - entityType: FileHash
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Algorithm
        columnName: AlgorithmEntity
      - identifier: Value
        columnName: FileHashEntity     
version: 1.0.3
kind: Scheduled

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `let`

let iocs = externaldata(DateAdded:string,IoC:string,Type:string) [@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/ZincOctober2022IOCs.csv"] with (format="csv", ignoreFirstRecord=True);
let file_path = (iocs | where Type =~ "filepath" | project IoC);
let commandline = (iocs | where Type =~ "commandline" | project IoC);

Stage 1: `union`

union isfuzzy=true

Stage 2: `source` time_window=21600s

DeviceNetworkEvents

Stage 3: `where`

| where  InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (file_path) or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (commandline)

Stage 4: `project`

| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, LocalIP, Type

Stage 5: `extend`

| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = DeviceName

Stage 6: `source`

Event

Stage 7: `where`

| where Source =~ "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"

Stage 8: `where`

| where EventID == 1

Stage 9: `extend`

| extend EvData = parse_xml(EventData)

Stage 10: `extend`

| extend EventDetail = EvData.DataItem.EventData.Data

Stage 11: `extend`

| extend Image = EventDetail.[4].["#text"],  CommandLine = EventDetail.[10].["#text"]

Stage 12: `where`

| where Image has_any (file_path)  or   CommandLine has_any (commandline)

Stage 13: `project`

| project TimeGenerated, EventDetail, UserName, Computer, Type, Source, CommandLine, Image

Stage 14: `extend`

| extend Type = strcat(Type, ": ", Source)

Stage 15: `extend`

| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = Computer , AccountEntity = UserName, ProcessEntity = tostring(split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1])

Stage 16: `source`

DeviceProcessEvents

Stage 17: `where`

| where  ( InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (file_path)) or ( InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (commandline))  or (InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (file_path)) or (InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (commandline)) or (FolderPath  has_any (file_path)) or (FolderPath has_any (commandline))

Stage 18: `project`

| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, FolderPath, Type

Stage 19: `extend`

| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = DeviceName , AccountEntity = InitiatingProcessAccountName, ProcessEntity = InitiatingProcessFileName

Stage 20: `source`

DeviceFileEvents

Stage 21: `where`

| where  (InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (file_path)) or (InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (commandline)) or (FolderPath  has_any (file_path)) or (FolderPath  has_any (commandline)) or ( InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (commandline)) or ( InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (file_path))

Stage 22: `project`

| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RequestAccountName, RequestSourceIP, InitiatingProcessSHA256, FolderPath, Type

Stage 23: `extend`

| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = DeviceName , AccountEntity = RequestAccountName, ProcessEntity = InitiatingProcessFileName, AlgorithmEntity = "SHA256", FileHashEntity = InitiatingProcessSHA256

Stage 24: `source`

DeviceEvents

Stage 25: `where`

| where  ( InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (file_path)) or ( InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (commandline)) or (InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (file_path)) or (InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (commandline)) or (FolderPath  has_any (file_path)) or (FolderPath has_any (commandline))

Stage 26: `project`

| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, Type

Stage 27: `extend`

| extend CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine

Stage 28: `extend`

| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = DeviceName , AccountEntity = InitiatingProcessAccountName, ProcessEntity = InitiatingProcessFileName

Stage 29: `source`

SecurityEvent

Stage 30: `where`

| where EventID == 4688

Stage 31: `where`

| where ( CommandLine has_any (file_path)) or ( CommandLine has_any (commandline))  or (NewProcessName has_any (file_path)) or (NewProcessName has_any (commandline)) or (ParentProcessName has_any (file_path)) or (ParentProcessName has_any (commandline))

Stage 32: `project`

| project TimeGenerated, Computer, NewProcessName, ParentProcessName, Account, NewProcessId, Type

Stage 33: `extend`

| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = Computer , AccountEntity = Account, ProcessEntity = NewProcessName

Stage 34: `extend`

| extend HostName = tostring(split(HostEntity, '.', 0)[0]), DnsDomain = tostring(strcat_array(array_slice(split(HostEntity, '.'), 1, -1), '.'))

Stage 35: `extend`

| extend Name = tostring(split(AccountEntity, '@', 0)[0]), UPNSuffix = tostring(split(AccountEntity, '@', 1)[0])

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`CommandLine`	match	`commandline` corpus 2 (splunk 1, kusto 1) `file_path`
`EventID`	eq	`1` transforms: `cased` corpus 232 (splunk 223, kusto 9) `4688` transforms: `cased` corpus 312 (splunk 283, kusto 29)
`FolderPath`	match	`commandline` `file_path`
`Image`	match	`file_path`
`InitiatingProcessCommandLine`	match	`commandline` corpus 2 (splunk 1, kusto 1) `file_path`
`InitiatingProcessFolderPath`	match	`commandline` `file_path`
`NewProcessName`	match	`commandline` `file_path`
`ParentProcessName`	match	`commandline` `file_path`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`Account`	`project`
`Computer`	`project`
`NewProcessId`	`project`
`NewProcessName`	`project`
`ParentProcessName`	`project`
`TimeGenerated`	`project`
`Type`	`project`
`AccountEntity`	`extend`
`HostEntity`	`extend`
`ProcessEntity`	`extend`
`timestamp`	`extend`
`DnsDomain`	`extend`
`HostName`	`extend`
`Name`	`extend`
`UPNSuffix`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Zinc Actor IOCs files - October 2022

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: let

Stage 1: union

Stage 2: source time_window=21600s

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: project

Stage 5: extend

Stage 6: source

Stage 7: where

Stage 8: where

Stage 9: extend

Stage 10: extend

Stage 11: extend

Stage 12: where

Stage 13: project

Stage 14: extend

Stage 15: extend

Stage 16: source

Stage 17: where

Stage 18: project

Stage 19: extend

Stage 20: source

Stage 21: where

Stage 22: project

Stage 23: extend

Stage 24: source

Stage 25: where

Stage 26: project

Stage 27: extend

Stage 28: extend

Stage 29: source

Stage 30: where

Stage 31: where

Stage 32: project

Stage 33: extend

Stage 34: extend

Stage 35: extend