Solorigate Named Pipe

Severity: high
Time window: 1d
Author: Microsoft Security Research
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

Identifies a match across various data feeds for named pipe IOCs related to the Solorigate incident. For the sysmon events required for this detection, logging for Named Pipe Events needs to be configured in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18) Reference: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/azure-sentinel/solarwinds-post-compromise-hunting-with-azure-sentinel/ba-p/1995095

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Privilege Escalation	`T1055` Process Injection
Stealth	`T1055` Process Injection

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 17	PipeEvent (Pipe Created)
Sysmon	Event ID 18	PipeEvent (Pipe Connected)
Security-Auditing	Event ID 5145	A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access.

Rule body kusto

id: 11b4c19d-2a79-4da3-af38-b067e1273dee
name: Solorigate Named Pipe
description: |
  'Identifies a match across various data feeds for named pipe IOCs related to the Solorigate incident.
   For the sysmon events required for this detection, logging for Named Pipe Events needs to be configured in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18)
   Reference: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/azure-sentinel/solarwinds-post-compromise-hunting-with-azure-sentinel/ba-p/1995095'
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: SecurityEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityEvent
  - connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityEvent
  - connectorId: WindowsForwardedEvents
    dataTypes:
      - WindowsEvent
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - DefenseEvasion
  - PrivilegeEscalation
relevantTechniques:
  - T1055
tags:
  - Solorigate
  - NOBELIUM
query: |
  (union isfuzzy=true
  (Event
  | where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
  | where EventID in (17,18)
  | where EventData has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'
  | extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
  | mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
  | evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
  | extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', "")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', "")
  | evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, EventID, UserName, MG, ManagementGroupName, _ResourceId)
  | extend PipeName = column_ifexists("PipeName", "")
  | extend Account = User
  | extend AccountName = tostring(split(User, @"\")[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(User, @"\")[0])
  ),
  (
  SecurityEvent
  | where EventID == '5145'
  // %%4418 looks for presence of CreatePipeInstance value
  | where AccessList has '%%4418'
  | where RelativeTargetName has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'
  | extend AccountName = SubjectUserName, AccountNTDomain = SubjectDomainName
  ),
  (
  WindowsEvent
  | where EventID == '5145' and EventData has '%%4418'  and EventData has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'
  // %%4418 looks for presence of CreatePipeInstance value
  | extend AccessList= tostring(EventData.AccessList)
  | where AccessList has '%%4418'
  | extend RelativeTargetName= tostring(EventData.RelativeTargetName)
  | where RelativeTargetName has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'
  | extend Account =  strcat(tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName),"\\", tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName))
  | extend AccountName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName), AccountNTDomain = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName)
  )
  )
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
  | project-away DomainIndex
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: Account
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: AccountNTDomain
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: Computer
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: HostNameDomain
version: 1.2.5
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
    source:
        kind: Community
    author:
        name: Microsoft Security Research
    support:
        tier: Community
    categories:
        domains: [ "Security - 0-day Vulnerability" ]

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `union`

union isfuzzy=true

Stage 2: `source` time_window=86400s

Event

Stage 3: `where`

| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"

Stage 4: `where`

| where EventID in (17,18)

Stage 5: `where`

| where EventData has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'

Stage 6: `extend`

| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data

Stage 7: `mv-expand`

| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData

Stage 8: `evaluate`

| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)

Stage 9: `extend`

| extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', "")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', "")

Stage 10: `evaluate`

| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, EventID, UserName, MG, ManagementGroupName, _ResourceId)

Stage 11: `extend`

| extend PipeName = column_ifexists("PipeName", "")

Stage 12: `extend`

| extend Account = User

Stage 13: `extend`

| extend AccountName = tostring(split(User, @"\")[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(User, @"\")[0])

Stage 14: `source`

SecurityEvent

Stage 15: `where`

| where EventID == '5145'

Stage 16: `where`

| where AccessList has '%%4418'

Stage 17: `where`

| where RelativeTargetName has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'

Stage 18: `extend`

| extend AccountName = SubjectUserName, AccountNTDomain = SubjectDomainName

Stage 19: `source`

WindowsEvent

Stage 20: `where`

| where EventID == '5145' and EventData has '%%4418'  and EventData has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'

Stage 21: `extend`

| extend AccessList= tostring(EventData.AccessList)

Stage 22: `where`

| where AccessList has '%%4418'

Stage 23: `extend`

| extend RelativeTargetName= tostring(EventData.RelativeTargetName)

Stage 24: `where`

| where RelativeTargetName has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'

Stage 25: `extend`

| extend Account =  strcat(tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName),"\\", tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName))

Stage 26: `extend`

| extend AccountName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName), AccountNTDomain = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName)

Stage 27: `extend`

| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))

Stage 28: `extend`

| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)

Stage 29: `project-away`

| project-away DomainIndex

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`AccessList`	match	`%%4418` corpus 3 (sigma 1, splunk 1, kusto 1)
`EventData`	match	`%%4418` `583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e`
`EventID`	eq	`5145` transforms: `cased` corpus 18 (splunk 16, kusto 2)
`EventID`	in	`17` corpus 4 (splunk 4) `18` corpus 6 (splunk 4, chronicle 1, kusto 1)
`RelativeTargetName`	match	`583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`EventData`	`extend`
`Key`	`extend`
`Value`	`extend`
`PipeName`	`extend`
`Account`	`extend`
`AccountNTDomain`	`extend`
`AccountName`	`extend`
`AccessList`	`extend`
`RelativeTargetName`	`extend`
`HostName`	`extend`
`HostNameDomain`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Solorigate Named Pipe

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `union`

Stage 2: `source` time_window=86400s

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `mv-expand`

Stage 8: `evaluate`

Stage 9: `extend`

Stage 10: `evaluate`

Stage 11: `extend`

Stage 12: `extend`

Stage 13: `extend`

Stage 14: `source`

Stage 15: `where`

Stage 16: `where`

Stage 17: `where`

Stage 18: `extend`

Stage 19: `source`

Stage 20: `where`

Stage 21: `extend`

Stage 22: `where`

Stage 23: `extend`

Stage 24: `where`

Stage 25: `extend`

Stage 26: `extend`

Stage 27: `extend`

Stage 28: `extend`

Stage 29: `project-away`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Solorigate Named Pipe

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: union

Stage 2: source time_window=86400s

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: where

Stage 6: extend

Stage 7: mv-expand

Stage 8: evaluate

Stage 9: extend

Stage 10: evaluate

Stage 11: extend

Stage 12: extend

Stage 13: extend

Stage 14: source

Stage 15: where

Stage 16: where

Stage 17: where

Stage 18: extend

Stage 19: source

Stage 20: where

Stage 21: extend

Stage 22: where

Stage 23: extend

Stage 24: where

Stage 25: extend

Stage 26: extend

Stage 27: extend

Stage 28: extend

Stage 29: project-away

Indicators

Output fields

Stage 1: `union`

Stage 2: `source` time_window=86400s

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `mv-expand`

Stage 8: `evaluate`

Stage 9: `extend`

Stage 10: `evaluate`

Stage 11: `extend`

Stage 12: `extend`

Stage 13: `extend`

Stage 14: `source`

Stage 15: `where`

Stage 16: `where`

Stage 17: `where`

Stage 18: `extend`

Stage 19: `source`

Stage 20: `where`

Stage 21: `extend`

Stage 22: `where`

Stage 23: `extend`

Stage 24: `where`

Stage 25: `extend`

Stage 26: `extend`

Stage 27: `extend`

Stage 28: `extend`

Stage 29: `project-away`