Security Service Registry ACL Modification

Severity: high
Time window: 1d
Author: Microsoft Security Research
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

Identifies attempts to modify registry ACL to evade security solutions. In the Solorigate attack, the attackers were found modifying registry permissions so services.exe cannot access the relevant registry keys to start the service. The detection leverages Security Event as well as MDE data to identify when specific security services registry permissions are modified. Only some portions of this detection are related to Solorigate, it also includes coverage for some common tools that perform this activity. Reference on guidance for enabling registry auditing: - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-auditing-faq - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/appendix-a-security-monitoring-recommendations-for-many-audit-events - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-registry - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4670 - For the event 4670 to be created the audit policy for the registry must have auditing enabled for Write DAC and/or Write Owner - https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule - https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/api/system.security.accesscontrol.registryrights?view=dotnet-plat-ext-5.0

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Stealth	`T1562` Impair Defenses

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4670	Permissions on an object were changed.
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4688	A new process has been created.

Rule body kusto

id: 473d57e6-f787-435c-a16b-b38b51fa9a4b
name: Security Service Registry ACL Modification
description: |
    'Identifies attempts to modify registry ACL to evade security solutions. In the Solorigate attack, the attackers were found modifying registry permissions so services.exe cannot access the relevant registry keys to start the service.
     The detection leverages Security Event as well as MDE data to identify when specific security services registry permissions are modified.
     Only some portions of this detection are related to Solorigate, it also includes coverage for some common tools that perform this activity.
     Reference on guidance for enabling registry auditing:
     - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-auditing-faq
     - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/appendix-a-security-monitoring-recommendations-for-many-audit-events
     - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-registry
     - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4670
       - For the event 4670 to be created the audit policy for the registry must have auditing enabled for Write DAC and/or Write Owner
     - https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule
     - https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/api/system.security.accesscontrol.registryrights?view=dotnet-plat-ext-5.0'
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: SecurityEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityEvent
  - connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
    dataTypes:
      - DeviceProcessEvents
  - connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityEvents
  - connectorId: WindowsForwardedEvents
    dataTypes:
      - WindowsEvent
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - DefenseEvasion
relevantTechniques:
  - T1562
tags:
  - Solorigate
  - NOBELIUM
query: |
  let servicelist = dynamic(['Services\\HealthService', 'Services\\Sense', 'Services\\WinDefend', 'Services\\MsSecFlt', 'Services\\DiagTrack', 'Services\\SgrmBroker', 'Services\\SgrmAgent', 'Services\\AATPSensorUpdater' , 'Services\\AATPSensor', 'Services\\mpssvc']);
  let filename = dynamic(["subinacl.exe",'SetACL.exe']);
  let parameters = dynamic (['/deny=SYSTEM', '/deny=S-1-5-18', '/grant=SYSTEM=r', '/grant=S-1-5-18=r', 'n:SYSTEM;p:READ', 'n1:SYSTEM;ta:remtrst;w:dacl']);
  let FullAccess = dynamic(['A;CI;KA;;;SY', 'A;ID;KA;;;SY', 'A;CIID;KA;;;SY']);
  let ReadAccess = dynamic(['A;CI;KR;;;SY', 'A;ID;KR;;;SY', 'A;CIID;KR;;;SY']);
  let DenyAccess = dynamic(['D;CI;KR;;;SY', 'D;ID;KR;;;SY', 'D;CIID;KR;;;SY']);
  let timeframe = 1d;
  (union isfuzzy=true
  (
  SecurityEvent
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
  | where EventID == 4670
  | where ObjectType == 'Key'
  | where ObjectName has_any (servicelist)
  | parse EventData with * 'OldSd">' OldSd "<" *
  | parse EventData with * 'NewSd">' NewSd "<" *
  | extend Reason = case( (OldSd has ';;;SY' and NewSd !has ';;;SY'), 'System Account is removed', (OldSd has_any (FullAccess) and NewSd has_any (ReadAccess)) , 'System permission has been changed to read from full access', (OldSd has_any (FullAccess) and NewSd has_any (DenyAccess)), 'System account has been given denied permission', 'None')
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account,  ProcessName, ProcessId, ObjectName, EventData, Activity, HandleId, SubjectLogonId, OldSd, NewSd , Reason
  ),
  (
  SecurityEvent
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
  | where EventID == 4688
  | extend ProcessName = tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\')[-1])
  | where ProcessName in~ (filename)
  | where CommandLine has_any (servicelist) and CommandLine has_any (parameters)
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, AccountDomain, ProcessName, ProcessNameFullPath = NewProcessName, EventID, Activity, CommandLine, EventSourceName, Type
  ),
  (
  WindowsEvent
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
  | where EventID == 4670 and EventData has_any (servicelist) and EventData has 'Key'
  | extend ObjectType = tostring(EventData.ObjectType)
  | where ObjectType == 'Key'
  | extend ObjectName = tostring(EventData.ObjectName)
  | where ObjectName has_any (servicelist)
  | extend OldSd = tostring(EventData.OldSd)
  | extend NewSd = tostring(EventData.NewSd)
  | extend Reason = case( (OldSd has ';;;SY' and NewSd !has ';;;SY'), 'System Account is removed', (OldSd has_any (FullAccess) and NewSd has_any (ReadAccess)) , 'System permission has been changed to read from full access', (OldSd has_any (FullAccess) and NewSd has_any (DenyAccess)), 'System account has been given denied permission', 'None')
  | extend Account =  strcat(tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName),"\\", tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName))
  | extend ProcessName = tostring(EventData.ProcessName)
  | extend ProcessId = tostring(EventData.ProcessId)
  | extend Activity= "4670 - Permissions on an object were changed."
  | extend HandleId = tostring(EventData.HandleId)
  | extend  SubjectLogonId = tostring(EventData.SubjectLogonId)
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account,  ProcessName, ProcessId, ObjectName, EventData, Activity, HandleId, SubjectLogonId, OldSd, NewSd , Reason
  ),
  (
  WindowsEvent
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
  | where EventID == 4688 and EventData has_any (filename) and EventData has_any (servicelist) and EventData has_any (parameters)
  | extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)
  | extend ProcessName = tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\')[-1])
  | where ProcessName in~ (filename)
  | extend CommandLine = tostring(EventData.CommandLine)
  | where CommandLine has_any (servicelist) and CommandLine has_any (parameters)
  | extend  Account =  strcat(tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName),"\\", tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName))
  | extend  AccountDomain = tostring(EventData.AccountDomain)
  | extend  Activity="4688 - A new process has been created."
  | extend  EventSourceName=Provider
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, AccountDomain, ProcessName, ProcessNameFullPath = NewProcessName, EventID, Activity, CommandLine, EventSourceName, Type
  ),
  (
  DeviceProcessEvents
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
  | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (filename)
  | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any(servicelist) and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (parameters)
  | extend Account = iff(isnotempty(InitiatingProcessAccountUpn), InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, InitiatingProcessAccountName), Computer = DeviceName
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, AccountDomain, ProcessName = InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessNameFullPath = FolderPath, Activity = ActionType, CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Type, InitiatingProcessParentFileName
  )
  )
  | extend AccountName = tostring(split(Account, "\\")[0]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(Account, "\\")[1])
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: Account
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: AccountNTDomain
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: Computer
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: HostNameDomain
version: 1.1.4
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
    source:
        kind: Community
    author:
        name: Microsoft Security Research
    support:
        tier: Community
    categories:
        domains: [ "Security - Others" ]

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `let`

let servicelist = dynamic(['Services\\HealthService', 'Services\\Sense', 'Services\\WinDefend', 'Services\\MsSecFlt', 'Services\\DiagTrack', 'Services\\SgrmBroker', 'Services\\SgrmAgent', 'Services\\AATPSensorUpdater' , 'Services\\AATPSensor', 'Services\\mpssvc']);
let filename = dynamic(["subinacl.exe",'SetACL.exe']);
let parameters = dynamic (['/deny=SYSTEM', '/deny=S-1-5-18', '/grant=SYSTEM=r', '/grant=S-1-5-18=r', 'n:SYSTEM;p:READ', 'n1:SYSTEM;ta:remtrst;w:dacl']);
let FullAccess = dynamic(['A;CI;KA;;;SY', 'A;ID;KA;;;SY', 'A;CIID;KA;;;SY']);
let ReadAccess = dynamic(['A;CI;KR;;;SY', 'A;ID;KR;;;SY', 'A;CIID;KR;;;SY']);
let DenyAccess = dynamic(['D;CI;KR;;;SY', 'D;ID;KR;;;SY', 'D;CIID;KR;;;SY']);
let timeframe = 1d;

Stage 1: `union`

union isfuzzy=true

Stage 2: `source`

SecurityEvent

Stage 3: `where` time_window=86400s

| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)

Stage 4: `where`

| where EventID == 4670

Stage 5: `where`

| where ObjectType == 'Key'

Stage 6: `where`

| where ObjectName has_any (servicelist)

Stage 7: `parse`

| parse EventData with * 'OldSd">' OldSd "<" *

Stage 8: `parse`

| parse EventData with * 'NewSd">' NewSd "<" *

Stage 9: `extend`

| extend Reason = case( (OldSd has ';;;SY' and NewSd !has ';;;SY'), 'System Account is removed', (OldSd has_any (FullAccess) and NewSd has_any (ReadAccess)) , 'System permission has been changed to read from full access', (OldSd has_any (FullAccess) and NewSd has_any (DenyAccess)), 'System account has been given denied permission', 'None')

Stage 10: `project`

| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account,  ProcessName, ProcessId, ObjectName, EventData, Activity, HandleId, SubjectLogonId, OldSd, NewSd , Reason

Stage 11: `source`

SecurityEvent

Stage 12: `where` time_window=86400s

| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)

Stage 13: `where`

| where EventID == 4688

Stage 14: `extend`

| extend ProcessName = tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\')[-1])

Stage 15: `where`

| where ProcessName in~ (filename)

Stage 16: `where`

| where CommandLine has_any (servicelist) and CommandLine has_any (parameters)

Stage 17: `project`

| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, AccountDomain, ProcessName, ProcessNameFullPath = NewProcessName, EventID, Activity, CommandLine, EventSourceName, Type

Stage 18: `source`

WindowsEvent

Stage 19: `where` time_window=86400s

| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)

Stage 20: `where`

| where EventID == 4670 and EventData has_any (servicelist) and EventData has 'Key'

Stage 21: `extend`

| extend ObjectType = tostring(EventData.ObjectType)

Stage 22: `where`

| where ObjectType == 'Key'

Stage 23: `extend`

| extend ObjectName = tostring(EventData.ObjectName)

Stage 24: `where`

| where ObjectName has_any (servicelist)

Stage 25: `extend`

| extend OldSd = tostring(EventData.OldSd)

Stage 26: `extend`

| extend NewSd = tostring(EventData.NewSd)

Stage 27: `extend`

| extend Reason = case( (OldSd has ';;;SY' and NewSd !has ';;;SY'), 'System Account is removed', (OldSd has_any (FullAccess) and NewSd has_any (ReadAccess)) , 'System permission has been changed to read from full access', (OldSd has_any (FullAccess) and NewSd has_any (DenyAccess)), 'System account has been given denied permission', 'None')

Stage 28: `extend`

| extend Account =  strcat(tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName),"\\", tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName))

Stage 29: `extend`

| extend ProcessName = tostring(EventData.ProcessName)

Stage 30: `extend`

| extend ProcessId = tostring(EventData.ProcessId)

Stage 31: `extend`

| extend Activity= "4670 - Permissions on an object were changed."

Stage 32: `extend`

| extend HandleId = tostring(EventData.HandleId)

Stage 33: `extend`

| extend  SubjectLogonId = tostring(EventData.SubjectLogonId)

Stage 34: `project`

| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account,  ProcessName, ProcessId, ObjectName, EventData, Activity, HandleId, SubjectLogonId, OldSd, NewSd , Reason

Stage 35: `source`

WindowsEvent

Stage 36: `where` time_window=86400s

| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)

Stage 37: `where`

| where EventID == 4688 and EventData has_any (filename) and EventData has_any (servicelist) and EventData has_any (parameters)

Stage 38: `extend`

| extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)

Stage 39: `extend`

| extend ProcessName = tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\')[-1])

Stage 40: `where`

| where ProcessName in~ (filename)

Stage 41: `extend`

| extend CommandLine = tostring(EventData.CommandLine)

Stage 42: `where`

| where CommandLine has_any (servicelist) and CommandLine has_any (parameters)

Stage 43: `extend`

| extend  Account =  strcat(tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName),"\\", tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName))

Stage 44: `extend`

| extend  AccountDomain = tostring(EventData.AccountDomain)

Stage 45: `extend`

| extend  Activity="4688 - A new process has been created."

Stage 46: `extend`

| extend  EventSourceName=Provider

Stage 47: `project`

| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, AccountDomain, ProcessName, ProcessNameFullPath = NewProcessName, EventID, Activity, CommandLine, EventSourceName, Type

Stage 48: `source`

DeviceProcessEvents

Stage 49: `where` time_window=86400s

| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)

Stage 50: `where`

| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (filename)

Stage 51: `where`

| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any(servicelist) and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (parameters)

Stage 52: `extend`

| extend Account = iff(isnotempty(InitiatingProcessAccountUpn), InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, InitiatingProcessAccountName), Computer = DeviceName

Stage 53: `project`

| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, AccountDomain, ProcessName = InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessNameFullPath = FolderPath, Activity = ActionType, CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Type, InitiatingProcessParentFileName

Stage 54: `extend`

| extend AccountName = tostring(split(Account, "\\")[0]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(Account, "\\")[1])

Stage 55: `extend`

| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))

Stage 56: `extend`

| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`CommandLine`	match	`/deny=S-1-5-18` `/deny=SYSTEM` `/grant=S-1-5-18=r` `/grant=SYSTEM=r` `Services\\AATPSensor` `Services\\AATPSensorUpdater` `Services\\DiagTrack` `Services\\HealthService` `Services\\MsSecFlt` `Services\\Sense` `Services\\SgrmAgent` `Services\\SgrmBroker` `Services\\WinDefend` `Services\\mpssvc` `n1:SYSTEM;ta:remtrst;w:dacl` `n:SYSTEM;p:READ`
`EventData`	match	`/deny=S-1-5-18` `/deny=SYSTEM` `/grant=S-1-5-18=r` `/grant=SYSTEM=r` `Key` `Services\\AATPSensor` `Services\\AATPSensorUpdater` `Services\\DiagTrack` `Services\\HealthService` `Services\\MsSecFlt` `Services\\Sense` `Services\\SgrmAgent` `Services\\SgrmBroker` `Services\\WinDefend` `Services\\mpssvc` `SetACL.exe` `n1:SYSTEM;ta:remtrst;w:dacl` `n:SYSTEM;p:READ` `subinacl.exe`
`EventID`	eq	`4670` transforms: `cased` `4688` transforms: `cased` corpus 312 (splunk 283, kusto 29)
`InitiatingProcessCommandLine`	match	`/deny=S-1-5-18` `/deny=SYSTEM` `/grant=S-1-5-18=r` `/grant=SYSTEM=r` `Services\\AATPSensor` `Services\\AATPSensorUpdater` `Services\\DiagTrack` `Services\\HealthService` `Services\\MsSecFlt` `Services\\Sense` `Services\\SgrmAgent` `Services\\SgrmBroker` `Services\\WinDefend` `Services\\mpssvc` `n1:SYSTEM;ta:remtrst;w:dacl` `n:SYSTEM;p:READ`
`InitiatingProcessFileName`	in	`SetACL.exe` `subinacl.exe`
`ObjectName`	match	`Services\\AATPSensor` `Services\\AATPSensorUpdater` `Services\\DiagTrack` `Services\\HealthService` `Services\\MsSecFlt` `Services\\Sense` `Services\\SgrmAgent` `Services\\SgrmBroker` `Services\\WinDefend` `Services\\mpssvc`
`ObjectType`	eq	`Key` transforms: `cased` corpus 8 (sigma 4, kusto 4)
`ProcessName`	in	`SetACL.exe` `subinacl.exe`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`Account`	`project`
`AccountDomain`	`project`
`Activity`	`project`
`CommandLine`	`project`
`Computer`	`project`
`InitiatingProcessParentFileName`	`project`
`ProcessName`	`project`
`ProcessNameFullPath`	`project`
`TimeGenerated`	`project`
`Type`	`project`
`AccountNTDomain`	`extend`
`AccountName`	`extend`
`DomainIndex`	`extend`
`HostName`	`extend`
`HostNameDomain`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Security Service Registry ACL Modification

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: let

Stage 1: union

Stage 2: source

Stage 3: where time_window=86400s

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: where

Stage 6: where

Stage 7: parse

Stage 8: parse

Stage 9: extend

Stage 10: project

Stage 11: source

Stage 12: where time_window=86400s

Stage 13: where

Stage 14: extend

Stage 15: where

Stage 16: where

Stage 17: project

Stage 18: source

Stage 19: where time_window=86400s

Stage 20: where

Stage 21: extend

Stage 22: where

Stage 23: extend

Stage 24: where

Stage 25: extend

Stage 26: extend

Stage 27: extend

Stage 28: extend

Stage 29: extend

Stage 30: extend

Stage 31: extend

Stage 32: extend

Stage 33: extend

Stage 34: project

Stage 35: source

Stage 36: where time_window=86400s

Stage 37: where

Stage 38: extend

Stage 39: extend

Stage 40: where

Stage 41: extend

Stage 42: where

Stage 43: extend

Stage 44: extend

Stage 45: extend

Stage 46: extend

Stage 47: project

Stage 48: source

Stage 49: where time_window=86400s

Stage 50: where

Stage 51: where

Stage 52: extend

Stage 53: project

Stage 54: extend

Stage 55: extend

Stage 56: extend