Potential Kerberos Relaying Activity - MDE

Time window: 20s
Group by: DeviceId, DeviceName
Author: Cyb3rMonk
Source: github.com/Cyb3r-Monk/Threat-Hunting-and-Detection

The below query detects potential Kerberos relaying event chain generated by KrbRelay.

References

https://github.com/cube0x0/KrbRelay

Event coverage

Provider	Event/ActionType	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 1	Process creation
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4688	A new process has been created.
Security-Auditing	Event ID 5156	The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a connection.
Defender-DeviceProcessEvents	ProcessCreated	Process created

Rule body kusto

// Author       : Cyb3rMonk(https://twitter.com/Cyb3rMonk, https://mergene.medium.com)
//
// Link to original post:
// https://posts.bluraven.io/detecting-kerberos-relaying-e6be66fa647c
//
// Description: This query detects potential Kerberos relaying event chain generated by KrbRelay(https://github.com/cube0x0/KrbRelay).
//
// Query parameters:
//
union DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(60m)
| extend PipeName_ = tostring(todynamic(AdditionalFields).PipeName)
| extend Action = case(
    (ActionType=="ConnectionSuccess" and RemotePort in (389, 636)), 'ConnectToDC', 
    (ActionType=="ListeningConnectionCreated"), 'ListeningConnectionCreated', 
    (ActionType=="NamedPipeEvent" and PipeName_ has @"Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener"), 'NamedPipeEvent',
    (ActionType=="ProcessCreated" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine == "svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p"), 'DcomProcessCreated',
    (ActionType=="ConnectionSuccess" and LocalIP==RemoteIP and InitiatingProcessParentFileName=="svchost.exe"), 'DcomProcessConnecToSelf', 'Other'
    )
| summarize Actions = make_set_if(Action, Action <> "Other") by DeviceId, DeviceName, bin(Timestamp,20s)
| where array_length(Actions)==5
| project-rename ActivityTimestamp = Timestamp
| join kind=inner (
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(60m)
    | where ActionType=="ProcessCreated" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine == "svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p"
    ) on DeviceId
    | where abs(datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ActivityTimestamp)) <=20

union DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(60m)
| extend PipeName_ = tostring(todynamic(AdditionalFields).PipeName)
| where 
    (ActionType=="ConnectionSuccess" and RemotePort in (389, 636)) or 
    (ActionType=="ListeningConnectionCreated") or 
    (ActionType=="NamedPipeEvent" and PipeName_ has @"Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener") or
    (ActionType=="ProcessCreated" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine == "svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p") or
    (ActionType=="ConnectionSuccess" and LocalIP==RemoteIP and InitiatingProcessParentFileName=="svchost.exe")
    | sort by Timestamp desc

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `union`

union

Stage 2: `source`

DeviceProcessEvents

Stage 3: `source`

DeviceEvents

Stage 4: `source`

DeviceNetworkEvents

Stage 5: `where` time_window=3600s

| where Timestamp > ago(60m)

Stage 6: `extend`

| extend PipeName_ = tostring(todynamic(AdditionalFields).PipeName)

Stage 7: `extend`

| extend Action = case(
    (ActionType=="ConnectionSuccess" and RemotePort in (389, 636)), 'ConnectToDC', 
    (ActionType=="ListeningConnectionCreated"), 'ListeningConnectionCreated', 
    (ActionType=="NamedPipeEvent" and PipeName_ has @"Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener"), 'NamedPipeEvent',
    (ActionType=="ProcessCreated" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine == "svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p"), 'DcomProcessCreated',
    (ActionType=="ConnectionSuccess" and LocalIP==RemoteIP and InitiatingProcessParentFileName=="svchost.exe"), 'DcomProcessConnecToSelf', 'Other'
    )

Stage 8: `summarize` time_window=20s

| summarize Actions = make_set_if(Action, Action <> "Other") by DeviceId, DeviceName, bin(Timestamp,20s)

Stage 9: `where`

| where array_length(Actions)==5

Stage 10: `project-rename`

| project-rename ActivityTimestamp = Timestamp

Stage 11: `join`

| join kind=inner (
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(60m)
    | where ActionType=="ProcessCreated" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine == "svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p"
    ) on DeviceId

Stage 12: `where`

| where abs(datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ActivityTimestamp)) <=20

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`ActionType`	eq	`ProcessCreated` transforms: `cased` corpus 10 (kusto 10)
`Actions`	eq	`5` transforms: `array_length`
`InitiatingProcessCommandLine`	eq	`svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p` transforms: `cased`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`Actions`	`summarize`
`DeviceId`	`summarize`
`DeviceName`	`summarize`
`ActivityTimestamp`	`project-rename`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Potential Kerberos Relaying Activity - MDE

References

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `union`

Stage 2: `source`

Stage 3: `source`

Stage 4: `source`

Stage 5: `where` time_window=3600s

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `extend`

Stage 8: `summarize` time_window=20s

Stage 9: `where`

Stage 10: `project-rename`

Stage 11: `join`

Stage 12: `where`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Potential Kerberos Relaying Activity - MDE

References

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: union

Stage 2: source

Stage 3: source

Stage 4: source

Stage 5: where time_window=3600s

Stage 6: extend

Stage 7: extend

Stage 8: summarize time_window=20s

Stage 9: where

Stage 10: project-rename

Stage 11: join

Stage 12: where

Indicators

Output fields

Stage 1: `union`

Stage 2: `source`

Stage 3: `source`

Stage 4: `source`

Stage 5: `where` time_window=3600s

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `extend`

Stage 8: `summarize` time_window=20s

Stage 9: `where`

Stage 10: `project-rename`

Stage 11: `join`

Stage 12: `where`