COM Registry Key Modified to Point to File in Color Profile Folder

Severity: medium
Time window: 1d
Author: Microsoft Security Research
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

This query looks for changes to COM registry keys to point to files in C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color. This can be used to enable COM hijacking for persistence. Ref: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/07/27/untangling-knotweed-european-private-sector-offensive-actor-using-0-day-exploits/

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Execution	`T1574` Hijack Execution Flow
Stealth	`T1574` Hijack Execution Flow

Event coverage

Provider	Event/ActionType	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 13	RegistryEvent (Value Set)
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4657	A registry value was modified.
Defender-DeviceRegistryEvents	RegistryValueSet	Registry value set

Rule body kusto

id: ed8c9153-6f7a-4602-97b4-48c336b299e1
name: COM Registry Key Modified to Point to File in Color Profile Folder
description: |
  'This query looks for changes to COM registry keys to point to files in C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\.
    This can be used to enable COM hijacking for persistence.
    Ref: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/07/27/untangling-knotweed-european-private-sector-offensive-actor-using-0-day-exploits/'
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
    dataTypes:
      - DeviceRegistryEvents
  - connectorId: SecurityEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityEvents
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Persistence
relevantTechniques:
  - T1574
tags:
  - KNOTWEED
query: |
  let guids = dynamic(["{ddc05a5a-351a-4e06-8eaf-54ec1bc2dcea}","{1f486a52-3cb1-48fd-8f50-b8dc300d9f9d}","{4590f811-1d3a-11d0-891f-00aa004b2e24}", "{4de225bf-cf59-4cfc-85f7-68b90f185355}", "{F56F6FDD-AA9D-4618-A949-C1B91AF43B1A}"]);
    let mde_data = DeviceRegistryEvents
    | where ActionType =~ "RegistryValueSet"
    | where RegistryKey contains "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID"
    | where RegistryKey has_any (guids)
    | where RegistryValueData has "System32\\spool\\drivers\\color";
    let event_data = SecurityEvent
    | where EventID == 4657
    | where ObjectName contains "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID"
    | where ObjectName has_any (guids)
    | where NewValue has "System32\\spool\\drivers\\color"
    | extend RegistryKey = ObjectName, RegistryValueData = NewValue, DeviceName=Computer, InitiatingProcessFileName = Process, InitiatingProcessAccountName=SubjectUserName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain = SubjectDomainName;
    union mde_data, event_data
    | extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))
    | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)
entityMappings:
  - entityType: RegistryKey
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Key
        columnName: RegistryKey
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: DeviceName
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: HostNameDomain
  - entityType: Process
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: ProcessId
        columnName: InitiatingProcessFileName
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountName
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountName
version: 1.1.1
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
    source:
        kind: Community
    author:
        name: Microsoft Security Research
    support:
        tier: Community
    categories:
        domains: [ "Security - Others" ]

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `let`

let guids = dynamic(["{ddc05a5a-351a-4e06-8eaf-54ec1bc2dcea}","{1f486a52-3cb1-48fd-8f50-b8dc300d9f9d}","{4590f811-1d3a-11d0-891f-00aa004b2e24}", "{4de225bf-cf59-4cfc-85f7-68b90f185355}", "{F56F6FDD-AA9D-4618-A949-C1B91AF43B1A}"]);
  let mde_data = DeviceRegistryEvents
  | where ActionType =~ "RegistryValueSet"
  | where RegistryKey contains "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID"
  | where RegistryKey has_any (guids)
  | where RegistryValueData has "System32\\spool\\drivers\\color";
  let event_data = SecurityEvent
  | where EventID == 4657
  | where ObjectName contains "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID"
  | where ObjectName has_any (guids)
  | where NewValue has "System32\\spool\\drivers\\color"
  | extend RegistryKey = ObjectName, RegistryValueData = NewValue, DeviceName=Computer, InitiatingProcessFileName = Process, InitiatingProcessAccountName=SubjectUserName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain = SubjectDomainName;

Stage 1: `source`

let event_data

Stage 2: `union`

union

Stage 3: `source` time_window=86400s

DeviceRegistryEvents

Stage 4: `where`

| where ActionType =~ "RegistryValueSet"

Stage 5: `where`

| where RegistryKey contains "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID"

Stage 6: `where`

| where RegistryKey has_any (guids)

Stage 7: `where`

| where RegistryValueData has "System32\\spool\\drivers\\color"

Stage 8: `source`

SecurityEvent

Stage 9: `where`

| where EventID == 4657

Stage 10: `where`

| where ObjectName contains "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID"

Stage 11: `where`

| where ObjectName has_any (guids)

Stage 12: `where`

| where NewValue has "System32\\spool\\drivers\\color"

Stage 13: `extend`

| extend RegistryKey = ObjectName, RegistryValueData = NewValue, DeviceName=Computer, InitiatingProcessFileName = Process, InitiatingProcessAccountName=SubjectUserName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain = SubjectDomainName

Stage 14: `extend`

| extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))

Stage 15: `extend`

| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`ActionType`	eq	`RegistryValueSet` corpus 4 (kusto 4)
`EventID`	eq	`4657` transforms: `cased` corpus 17 (splunk 14, kusto 3)
`NewValue`	match	`System32\\spool\\drivers\\color`
`ObjectName`	contains	`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID`
`ObjectName`	match	`{1f486a52-3cb1-48fd-8f50-b8dc300d9f9d}` `{4590f811-1d3a-11d0-891f-00aa004b2e24}` `{4de225bf-cf59-4cfc-85f7-68b90f185355}` `{F56F6FDD-AA9D-4618-A949-C1B91AF43B1A}` `{ddc05a5a-351a-4e06-8eaf-54ec1bc2dcea}`
`RegistryKey`	contains	`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID`
`RegistryKey`	match	`{1f486a52-3cb1-48fd-8f50-b8dc300d9f9d}` `{4590f811-1d3a-11d0-891f-00aa004b2e24}` `{4de225bf-cf59-4cfc-85f7-68b90f185355}` `{F56F6FDD-AA9D-4618-A949-C1B91AF43B1A}` `{ddc05a5a-351a-4e06-8eaf-54ec1bc2dcea}`
`RegistryValueData`	match	`System32\\spool\\drivers\\color`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`DeviceName`	`extend`
`InitiatingProcessAccountDomain`	`extend`
`InitiatingProcessAccountName`	`extend`
`InitiatingProcessFileName`	`extend`
`RegistryKey`	`extend`
`RegistryValueData`	`extend`
`DomainIndex`	`extend`
`HostName`	`extend`
`HostNameDomain`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

COM Registry Key Modified to Point to File in Color Profile Folder

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `let`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `union`

Stage 3: `source` time_window=86400s

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `where`

Stage 7: `where`

Stage 8: `source`

Stage 9: `where`

Stage 10: `where`

Stage 11: `where`

Stage 12: `where`

Stage 13: `extend`

Stage 14: `extend`

Stage 15: `extend`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

COM Registry Key Modified to Point to File in Color Profile Folder

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: let

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: union

Stage 3: source time_window=86400s

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: where

Stage 6: where

Stage 7: where

Stage 8: source

Stage 9: where

Stage 10: where

Stage 11: where

Stage 12: where

Stage 13: extend

Stage 14: extend

Stage 15: extend

Indicators

Output fields

Stage 0: `let`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `union`

Stage 3: `source` time_window=86400s

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `where`

Stage 7: `where`

Stage 8: `source`

Stage 9: `where`

Stage 10: `where`

Stage 11: `where`

Stage 12: `where`

Stage 13: `extend`

Stage 14: `extend`

Stage 15: `extend`