Detection rules › Elastic
Windows Event Logs Cleared
Identifies attempts to clear Windows event log stores. This is often done by attackers in an attempt to evade detection or destroy forensic evidence on a system.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Defense Evasion | T1070 Indicator Removal, T1070.001 Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Eventlog | 104 | The LogFileCleared.Channel log file was cleared. |
| Eventlog | 1102 | The audit log was cleared. |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: kql:query
event.action:("Log clear" or "audit-log-cleared") and winlog.channel:("Security" or "System")Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
event.action | in |
|
winlog.channel | in |
|
Neighbors
Often fire together
Rules that target events appearing in the same incident timelines. They pattern-match on adjacent steps of the same TTP, so an alert from one is often paired with alerts from these. Useful for triage context and for assembling chained-detection rules.
Share event IDs (chain-detection candidates)
Rules that observe the same Windows event-ID pairs as this one. If you're authoring a multi-stage / sequence rule that spans these events, these are the existing detections that already cover one or both endpoints.