Detection rules › Elastic
Potential Kerberos Coercion via DNS-Based SPN Spoofing
Identifies the creation of a DNS record containing a base64-encoded blob matching the pattern "UWhRCA...BAAAA". This pattern corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure, commonly used in Kerberos coercion attacks. It is associated with tools and techniques that exploit SPN spoofing via DNS. Adversaries may abuse this to coerce victim systems into authenticating to attacker-controlled hosts while requesting Kerberos tickets for legitimate services (often the victim's own identity). This enables reflective Kerberos relay attacks, potentially resulting in privileged access such as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, without relying on NTLM fallback.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
Event coverage
| Provider | Event ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | 4662 | An operation was performed on an object. |
| Security-Auditing | 5137 | A directory service object was created. |
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: kql:query
(winlog.event_data.AdditionalInfo:"*UWhRC*BAAAA*MicrosoftDNS*" or winlog.event_data.ObjectDN:"*UWhRC*BAAAA*MicrosoftDNS*")Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
winlog.event_data.AdditionalInfo | wildcard |
|
winlog.event_data.ObjectDN | wildcard |
|
Neighbors
Often fire together
Rules that target events appearing in the same incident timelines. They pattern-match on adjacent steps of the same TTP, so an alert from one is often paired with alerts from these. Useful for triage context and for assembling chained-detection rules.
- Suspicious Remote Registry Access via SeBackupPrivilege
- Startup/Logon Script added to Group Policy Object
- Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO
- Persistence and Execution at Scale via GPO Scheduled Task
- Potential Kerberos Coercion by Spoofing SPNs via DNS Manipulation
- Startup/Logon Script Added to Group Policy Object
- Windows AD Short Lived Server Object
- Windows Administrative Shares Accessed On Multiple Hosts
Share event IDs (chain-detection candidates)
Rules that observe the same Windows event-ID pairs as this one. If you're authoring a multi-stage / sequence rule that spans these events, these are the existing detections that already cover one or both endpoints.