Suspicious Powershell In Registry Run Keys

Severity: medium
Time window: 5m
Match by: hostname
Source: github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

Detects potential PowerShell commands or code within registry run keys

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Persistence	`T1547.001` Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

References

https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_powershell_in_run_keys.yml

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 13	RegistryEvent (Value Set)
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4657	A registry value was modified.

Rule body yaral

/*
 * Copyright 2025 Google LLC
 *
 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
 * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
 * You may obtain a copy of the License at
 *
 *     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
 *
 * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
 * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
 * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 * limitations under the License.
 */

rule suspicious_powershell_in_registry_run_keys {

  meta:
    author = "frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)"
    description = "Detects potential PowerShell commands or code within registry run keys"
    reference = "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_powershell_in_run_keys.yml"
    license = "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/Detection-Rule-License/blob/main/LICENSE.Detection.Rules.md"
    rule_name = "Suspicious Powershell In Registry Run Keys"
    rule_id = "mr_ad75681b-474a-4022-9e35-d6beffcf9a4a"
    sigma_uuid = "8d85cf08-bf97-4260-ba49-986a2a65129c"
    sigma_status = "test"
    tactic = "TA0003"
    technique = "T1547.001"
    data_source = "Sysmon"
    platform = "Windows"
    severity = "Medium"
    priority = "Medium"
    false_positives = "Legitimate admin or third party scripts"

  events:
    $reg.metadata.event_type = "REGISTRY_MODIFICATION"
    (
        (
            strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_key), "\\software\\microsoft\\windows\\currentversion\\run") or
            strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_key), "\\software\\wow6432node\\microsoft\\windows\\currentversion\\run") or
            strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_key), "\\software\\microsoft\\windows\\currentversion\\policies\\explorer\\run")
        )
        and
        (
            strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), "powershell") or
            strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), "pwsh ") or
            strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), "frombase64string") or
            strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), ".downloadfile(") or
            strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), ".downloadstring(") or
            strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), " -w hidden ") or
            strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), " -w 1 ") or
            strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), "-windowstyle hidden") or
            strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), "-window hidden") or
            strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), " -nop ") or
            strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), " -encodedcommand ") or
            strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), "-executionpolicy bypass") or
            strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), "invoke-expression") or
            strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), "iex (") or
            strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), "invoke-command") or
            strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), "icm -") or
            strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), "invoke-webrequest") or
            strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), "iwr ") or
            strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), " -noni ") or
            strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), " -noninteractive ")
        )
    )

    $reg.principal.hostname = $hostname

  match:
    $hostname over 5m

  outcome:
    //example usage of specifying test user and hostname to adjust risk score
    $risk_score = max(if($reg.principal.user.userid = "user" and $reg.principal.hostname = "hostname", 0, 15))
    $principal_hostname = array_distinct($reg.principal.hostname)
    $principal_process_pid = array_distinct($reg.principal.process.pid)
    $principal_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($reg.principal.process.file.full_path)
    $principal_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($reg.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
    $principal_user_userid = array_distinct($reg.principal.user.userid)
    $target_registry_key = array_distinct($reg.target.registry.registry_key)
    $target_registry_value_data = array_distinct($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data)
    $log_type = array_distinct(strings.concat($reg.metadata.log_type,"/",$reg.metadata.product_event_type))

  condition:
    $reg
}

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `match + condition`

match:
    $hostname over 5m
condition:
    $reg

Fires when at least one $reg event in the 5m window.

Stage 1: `events: $reg · REGISTRY_MODIFICATION`

$reg.metadata.event_type = "REGISTRY_MODIFICATION"
(
    (
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_key), "\\software\\microsoft\\windows\\currentversion\\run") or
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_key), "\\software\\wow6432node\\microsoft\\windows\\currentversion\\run") or
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_key), "\\software\\microsoft\\windows\\currentversion\\policies\\explorer\\run")
    )
    and
    (
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), "powershell") or
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), "pwsh ") or
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), "frombase64string") or
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), ".downloadfile(") or
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), ".downloadstring(") or
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), " -w hidden ") or
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), " -w 1 ") or
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), "-windowstyle hidden") or
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), "-window hidden") or
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), " -nop ") or
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), " -encodedcommand ") or
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), "-executionpolicy bypass") or
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), "invoke-expression") or
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), "iex (") or
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), "invoke-command") or
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), "icm -") or
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), "invoke-webrequest") or
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), "iwr ") or
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), " -noni ") or
        strings.contains(strings.to_lower($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data), " -noninteractive ")
    )
)

$reg.principal.hostname = $hostname

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`target.registry.registry_key`	contains	`\\software\\microsoft\\windows\\currentversion\\policies\\explorer\\run` transforms: `tolower` corpus 2 (chronicle 2) `\\software\\microsoft\\windows\\currentversion\\run` transforms: `tolower` corpus 2 (chronicle 2) `\\software\\wow6432node\\microsoft\\windows\\currentversion\\run` transforms: `tolower` corpus 2 (chronicle 2)
`target.registry.registry_value_data`	contains	`-encodedcommand` transforms: `tolower` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `-noni` transforms: `tolower` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `-noninteractive` transforms: `tolower` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `-nop` transforms: `tolower` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `-w 1` transforms: `tolower` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `-w hidden` transforms: `tolower` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `-executionpolicy bypass` transforms: `tolower` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `-window hidden` transforms: `tolower` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `-windowstyle hidden` transforms: `tolower` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `.downloadfile(` transforms: `tolower` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `.downloadstring(` transforms: `tolower` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `frombase64string` transforms: `tolower` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `icm -` transforms: `tolower` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `iex (` transforms: `tolower` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `invoke-command` transforms: `tolower` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `invoke-expression` transforms: `tolower` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `invoke-webrequest` transforms: `tolower` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `iwr` transforms: `tolower` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1) `powershell` transforms: `tolower` corpus 10 (sigma 9, chronicle 1) `pwsh` transforms: `tolower` corpus 2 (sigma 1, chronicle 1)

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`risk_score`	`max(if($reg.principal.user.userid = "user" and $reg.principal.hostname = "hostname", 0, 15))`
`principal_hostname`	`array_distinct($reg.principal.hostname)`
`principal_process_pid`	`array_distinct($reg.principal.process.pid)`
`principal_process_file_full_path`	`array_distinct($reg.principal.process.file.full_path)`
`principal_process_product_specific_process_id`	`array_distinct($reg.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)`
`principal_user_userid`	`array_distinct($reg.principal.user.userid)`
`target_registry_key`	`array_distinct($reg.target.registry.registry_key)`
`target_registry_value_data`	`array_distinct($reg.target.registry.registry_value_data)`
`log_type`	`array_distinct(strings.concat($reg.metadata.log_type,"/",$reg.metadata.product_event_type))`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Suspicious Powershell In Registry Run Keys

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Event coverage

Rule body yaral

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `match + condition`

Stage 1: `events: $reg · REGISTRY_MODIFICATION`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Suspicious Powershell In Registry Run Keys

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Event coverage

Rule body yaral

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: match + condition

Stage 1: events: $reg · REGISTRY_MODIFICATION

Indicators

Output fields

Stage 0: `match + condition`

Stage 1: `events: $reg · REGISTRY_MODIFICATION`