Detection rules › YARA-L
Suspicious Curl.EXE Download
Detects a suspicious curl process start on Windows and outputs the requested document to a local file
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Command & Control | T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer |
References
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
Rule body yaral
/*
* Copyright 2025 Google LLC
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
rule suspicious_curl_exe_download {
meta:
author = "Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)"
description = "Detects a suspicious curl process start on Windows and outputs the requested document to a local file"
reference = "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_curl_susp_download.yml"
license = "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/Detection-Rule-License/blob/main/LICENSE.Detection.Rules.md"
rule_name = "Suspicious Curl.EXE Download"
sigma_uuid = "e218595b-bbe7-4ee5-8a96-f32a24ad3468"
sigma_status = "test"
rule_id = "mr_51da61c3-b1c7-4dd1-ad4c-ab5dfc96e075"
tactic = "TA0011"
technique = "T1105"
type = "Detection"
data_source = "Sysmon"
platform = "Windows"
severity = "High"
priority = "High"
false_positives = "Unknown"
events:
$process.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
(
re.regex($process.target.process.file.full_path, `\\curl\.exe$`) nocase or
$process.target.asset.software.description = "The curl executable" nocase
)
(
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "%appdata%") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "%public%") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "%temp%") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "%tmp%") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "\\appdata\\") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "\\desktop\\") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "\\temp\\") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "\\users\\public\\") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "c:\\perflogs\\") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "c:\\programdata\\") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "c:\\windows\\temp\\") or
re.regex($process.target.process.command_line, `\.(dll|gif|jpeg|jpg|png|temp|tmp|txt|vbe|vbs)$`) NOCASE
)
not (
$process.principal.process.file.full_path = "C:\\Program Files\\Git\\usr\\bin\\sh.exe" and
$process.target.process.file.full_path = "C:\\Program Files\\Git\\mingw64\\bin\\curl.exe" and
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "--silent --show-error --output ") and
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "gfw-httpget-") and
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "appdata")
)
$process.principal.hostname = $hostname
match:
$hostname over 5m
outcome:
//example usage of specifying test user and hostname to adjust risk score
$risk_score = max(if($process.principal.user.userid = "user" and $process.principal.hostname = "hostname", 0, 15))
$principal_process_pid = array_distinct($process.principal.process.pid)
$principal_process_command_line = array_distinct($process.principal.process.command_line)
$principal_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.sha256)
$principal_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.full_path)
$principal_process_product_specfic_process_id = array_distinct($process.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
$principal_process_parent_process_product_specfic_process_id = array_distinct($process.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
$target_process_pid = array_distinct($process.target.process.pid)
$target_process_command_line = array_distinct($process.target.process.command_line)
$target_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($process.target.process.file.sha256)
$target_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($process.target.process.file.full_path)
$target_process_product_specfic_process_id = array_distinct($process.target.process.product_specific_process_id)
$principal_user_userid = array_distinct($process.principal.user.userid)
$log_type = array_distinct(strings.concat($process.metadata.log_type,"/",$process.metadata.product_event_type))
condition:
$process
}
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: match + condition
match:
$hostname over 5m
condition:
$process
Fires when at least one $process event in the 5m window.
Stage 1: events: $process · PROCESS_LAUNCH
$process.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
(
re.regex($process.target.process.file.full_path, `\\curl\.exe$`) nocase or
$process.target.asset.software.description = "The curl executable" nocase
)
(
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "%appdata%") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "%public%") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "%temp%") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "%tmp%") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "\\appdata\\") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "\\desktop\\") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "\\temp\\") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "\\users\\public\\") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "c:\\perflogs\\") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "c:\\programdata\\") or
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "c:\\windows\\temp\\") or
re.regex($process.target.process.command_line, `\.(dll|gif|jpeg|jpg|png|temp|tmp|txt|vbe|vbs)$`) NOCASE
)
not (
$process.principal.process.file.full_path = "C:\\Program Files\\Git\\usr\\bin\\sh.exe" and
$process.target.process.file.full_path = "C:\\Program Files\\Git\\mingw64\\bin\\curl.exe" and
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "--silent --show-error --output ") and
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "gfw-httpget-") and
strings.contains(strings.to_lower($process.target.process.command_line), "appdata")
)
$process.principal.hostname = $hostname
Exclusions
Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.
| Stage | Field | Kind | Excluded values |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | principal.process.file.full_path | eq | C:\\Program Files\\Git\\usr\\bin\\sh.exe |
| 1 | target.process.command_line | contains | --silent --show-error --output |
| 1 | target.process.command_line | contains | appdata |
| 1 | target.process.command_line | contains | gfw-httpget- |
| 1 | target.process.file.full_path | eq | C:\\Program Files\\Git\\mingw64\\bin\\curl.exe |
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
target.asset.software.description | eq |
|
target.process.command_line | contains |
|
target.process.command_line | regex_match |
|
target.process.file.full_path | regex_match |
|
Output fields
Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.
| Field | Source |
|---|---|
risk_score | max(if($process.principal.user.userid = "user" and $process.principal.hostname = "hostname", 0, 15)) |
principal_process_pid | array_distinct($process.principal.process.pid) |
principal_process_command_line | array_distinct($process.principal.process.command_line) |
principal_process_file_sha256 | array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.sha256) |
principal_process_file_full_path | array_distinct($process.principal.process.file.full_path) |
principal_process_product_specfic_process_id | array_distinct($process.principal.process.product_specific_process_id) |
principal_process_parent_process_product_specfic_process_id | array_distinct($process.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id) |
target_process_pid | array_distinct($process.target.process.pid) |
target_process_command_line | array_distinct($process.target.process.command_line) |
target_process_file_sha256 | array_distinct($process.target.process.file.sha256) |
target_process_file_full_path | array_distinct($process.target.process.file.full_path) |
target_process_product_specfic_process_id | array_distinct($process.target.process.product_specific_process_id) |
principal_user_userid | array_distinct($process.principal.user.userid) |
log_type | array_distinct(strings.concat($process.metadata.log_type,"/",$process.metadata.product_event_type)) |