Detection rules › YARA-L
Hacktool - WinPEAS Execution Patterns
This detection rule identifies the execution of WinPEAS (Windows Privilege Escalation Awesome Script), a post-exploitation reconnaissance tool used to discover privilege escalation paths on Windows systems. WinPEAS performs a wide range of local enumeration checks, including service misconfigurations, permission issues, token privileges, and more. Its usage is commonly observed during red team assessments and by adversaries seeking to elevate privileges after gaining initial access. WinPEAS checks are well-documented in the HackTricks knowledge base.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Discovery | T1082 System Information Discovery |
References
- https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng
- https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022-10-14/new-prestige-ransomware-impacts-organizations-in-ukraine-and-poland/
- https://www.logpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/emerging-threats-the-play-report.pdf
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
Rule body yaral
/*
* Copyright 2025 Google LLC
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
rule hacktool_winpeas_execution_patterns {
meta:
author = "Georg Lauenstein - suresecure GmbH"
description = "This detection rule identifies the execution of WinPEAS (Windows Privilege Escalation Awesome Script), a post-exploitation reconnaissance tool used to discover privilege escalation paths on Windows systems. WinPEAS performs a wide range of local enumeration checks, including service misconfigurations, permission issues, token privileges, and more. Its usage is commonly observed during red team assessments and by adversaries seeking to elevate privileges after gaining initial access. WinPEAS checks are well-documented in the HackTricks knowledge base."
rule_id = "mr_9c9ad668-485a-4b10-b85d-36ba63546304"
rule_name = "Hacktool - WinPEAS Execution Patterns"
tactic = "TA0007"
technique = "T1082"
references = "https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng, https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022-10-14/new-prestige-ransomware-impacts-organizations-in-ukraine-and-poland/, https://www.logpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/emerging-threats-the-play-report.pdf"
type = "alert"
platform = "Windows, EDR"
data_source = "Microsoft Sysmon, Windows Event Logs"
severity = "Medium" // Adjust based on your risk assessment
priority = "Medium" // Adjust based on your incident response process
events:
$winpeas_execution.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
and
(
$winpeas_execution.src.process.file.full_path = /winPEAS.exe|winPEASany.exe|winPEASany_ofs.exe|winPEASx64.exe|winPEASx64_ofs.exe|winPEASx86.exe|winPEASx86_ofs.exe/ nocase or
$winpeas_execution.target.process.file.full_path = /\\winPEAS\.exe|\\winPEASany\.exe|\\winPEASany_ofs\.exe|\\winPEASx64\.exe|\\winPEASx64_ofs\.exe|\\winPEASx86\.exe|\\winPEASx86_ofs\.exe/ nocase or
$winpeas_execution.target.process.command_line = /processinfo|servicesinfo|applicationsinfo|networkinfo|windowscreds|browserinfo|filesinfo|fileanalysis|eventsinfo/ nocase
or
(
$winpeas_execution.target.process.command_line = /raw\.githubusercontent\.com/ nocase and
$winpeas_execution.target.process.command_line = /carlospolop/ nocase and
$winpeas_execution.target.process.command_line = /winPEAS\.ps1/ nocase
)
or
(
$winpeas_execution.principal.process.command_line = / -linpeas$/ nocase or
$winpeas_execution.target.process.command_line = / -linpeas$/ nocase
)
)
not
(
// Exclusion: Microsoft Defender Threat Protection Sensor Updates
$winpeas_execution.additional.fields["current_directory"] = "C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\\Downloads\\"
)
// Capture the hostname where the event occurred
$winpeas_execution.principal.hostname = $hostname
match:
$hostname over 10m
outcome:
$risk_score = max(65)
$event_count = count_distinct($winpeas_execution.metadata.id)
$principal_process_pid = array_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.process.pid)
$principal_process_command_line = array_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.process.command_line)
$principal_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.process.file.sha256)
$principal_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.process.file.full_path)
$principal_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
$principal_process_parent_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
$target_process_pid = array_distinct($winpeas_execution.target.process.pid)
$target_process_command_line = array_distinct($winpeas_execution.target.process.command_line)
$target_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($winpeas_execution.target.process.file.sha256)
$target_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($winpeas_execution.target.process.file.full_path)
$target_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($winpeas_execution.target.process.product_specific_process_id)
$principal_user_userid = array_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.user.userid)
condition:
$winpeas_execution
}
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: match + condition
match:
$hostname over 10m
condition:
$winpeas_execution
Fires when at least one $winpeas_execution event in the 10m window.
Stage 1: events: $winpeas_execution · PROCESS_LAUNCH
$winpeas_execution.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
and
(
$winpeas_execution.src.process.file.full_path = /winPEAS.exe|winPEASany.exe|winPEASany_ofs.exe|winPEASx64.exe|winPEASx64_ofs.exe|winPEASx86.exe|winPEASx86_ofs.exe/ nocase or
$winpeas_execution.target.process.file.full_path = /\\winPEAS\.exe|\\winPEASany\.exe|\\winPEASany_ofs\.exe|\\winPEASx64\.exe|\\winPEASx64_ofs\.exe|\\winPEASx86\.exe|\\winPEASx86_ofs\.exe/ nocase or
$winpeas_execution.target.process.command_line = /processinfo|servicesinfo|applicationsinfo|networkinfo|windowscreds|browserinfo|filesinfo|fileanalysis|eventsinfo/ nocase
or
(
$winpeas_execution.target.process.command_line = /raw\.githubusercontent\.com/ nocase and
$winpeas_execution.target.process.command_line = /carlospolop/ nocase and
$winpeas_execution.target.process.command_line = /winPEAS\.ps1/ nocase
)
or
(
$winpeas_execution.principal.process.command_line = / -linpeas$/ nocase or
$winpeas_execution.target.process.command_line = / -linpeas$/ nocase
)
)
not
(
// Exclusion: Microsoft Defender Threat Protection Sensor Updates
$winpeas_execution.additional.fields["current_directory"] = "C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\\Downloads\\"
)
// Capture the hostname where the event occurred
$winpeas_execution.principal.hostname = $hostname
Exclusions
Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.
| Stage | Field | Kind | Excluded values |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | additional.fields["current_directory"] | eq | C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\\Downloads\\ |
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
principal.process.command_line | regex_match |
|
src.process.file.full_path | regex_match |
|
target.process.command_line | regex_match |
|
target.process.file.full_path | regex_match |
|
Output fields
Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.
| Field | Source |
|---|---|
risk_score | max(65) |
event_count | count_distinct($winpeas_execution.metadata.id) |
principal_process_pid | array_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.process.pid) |
principal_process_command_line | array_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.process.command_line) |
principal_process_file_sha256 | array_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.process.file.sha256) |
principal_process_file_full_path | array_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.process.file.full_path) |
principal_process_product_specific_process_id | array_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.process.product_specific_process_id) |
principal_process_parent_process_product_specific_process_id | array_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id) |
target_process_pid | array_distinct($winpeas_execution.target.process.pid) |
target_process_command_line | array_distinct($winpeas_execution.target.process.command_line) |
target_process_file_sha256 | array_distinct($winpeas_execution.target.process.file.sha256) |
target_process_file_full_path | array_distinct($winpeas_execution.target.process.file.full_path) |
target_process_product_specific_process_id | array_distinct($winpeas_execution.target.process.product_specific_process_id) |
principal_user_userid | array_distinct($winpeas_execution.principal.user.userid) |