Detection rules › YARA-L
Hacktool - SharpSuccessor Execution
SharpSuccessor is a .NET-based post-exploitation tool designed to weaponize the BadSuccessor attack discovered by Yuval Gordon (@YuG0rd) from Akamai. It allows a low-privileged user with 'CreateChild' permissions over any Organizational Unit (OU) in an Active Directory domain to escalate privileges to Domain Administrator. This detection rule identifies execution patterns or behavioral indicators linked to SharpSuccessor activity, which may signal privilege escalation attempts in Active Directory environments.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation | T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation |
References
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
Rule body yaral
/*
* Copyright 2025 Google LLC
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
rule hacktool_sharp_successor_execution {
meta:
author = "Georg Lauenstein - suresecure GmbH, Mohamed Abdelfattah - suresecure GmbH"
description = "SharpSuccessor is a .NET-based post-exploitation tool designed to weaponize the BadSuccessor attack discovered by Yuval Gordon (@YuG0rd) from Akamai. It allows a low-privileged user with 'CreateChild' permissions over any Organizational Unit (OU) in an Active Directory domain to escalate privileges to Domain Administrator. This detection rule identifies execution patterns or behavioral indicators linked to SharpSuccessor activity, which may signal privilege escalation attempts in Active Directory environments."
rule_id = "mr_be51aa7d-b4b8-4d8c-9998-0aa3194e98c3"
rule_name = "Hacktool - SharpSuccessor Execution"
tactic = "TA0004"
technique = "T1068"
references = "https://academy.bluraven.io/blog/detecting-badsuccessor, https://github.com/logangoins/SharpSuccessor"
type = "alert"
platform = "Windows, EDR"
data_source = "Microsoft Sysmon, Windows Security Event Log, Microsoft Defender XDR"
severity = "High"
priority = "High"
events:
(
$sharp_successor_execution.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
and (
$sharp_successor_execution.src.process.file.full_path = "SharpSuccessor.exe" nocase or
$sharp_successor_execution.target.asset.software.description = "SharpSuccessor" nocase or
$sharp_successor_execution.target.process.file.full_path = /\\SharpSuccessor\.exe/ nocase or
$sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.file.full_path = /\\SharpSuccessor\.exe/ nocase or
$sharp_successor_execution.target.process.command_line = /SharpSuccessor/ nocase
)
)
or
( // Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing -- EventCode: 4673
$sharp_successor_execution.metadata.event_type = "SERVICE_UNSPECIFIED"
and (
$sharp_successor_execution.metadata.description = "A privileged service was called" and
$sharp_successor_execution.target.process.command_line = /SharpSuccessor/ nocase
)
)
// Capture the hostname where the event occurred
$sharp_successor_execution.principal.hostname = $hostname
match:
$hostname over 10m
outcome:
$risk_score = 65
$event_count = count_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.metadata.id)
$principal_process_pid = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.pid)
$principal_process_command_line = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.command_line)
$principal_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.file.sha256)
$principal_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.file.full_path)
$principal_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
$principal_process_parent_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
$target_process_pid = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.pid)
$target_process_command_line = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.command_line)
$target_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.file.sha256)
$target_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.file.full_path)
$target_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.product_specific_process_id)
$principal_user_userid = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.user.userid)
condition:
$sharp_successor_execution
}
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: match + condition
match:
$hostname over 10m
condition:
$sharp_successor_execution
Fires when at least one $sharp_successor_execution event in the 10m window.
Stage 1: events: $sharp_successor_execution · PROCESS_LAUNCH
(
$sharp_successor_execution.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
and (
$sharp_successor_execution.src.process.file.full_path = "SharpSuccessor.exe" nocase or
$sharp_successor_execution.target.asset.software.description = "SharpSuccessor" nocase or
$sharp_successor_execution.target.process.file.full_path = /\\SharpSuccessor\.exe/ nocase or
$sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.file.full_path = /\\SharpSuccessor\.exe/ nocase or
$sharp_successor_execution.target.process.command_line = /SharpSuccessor/ nocase
)
)
or
( // Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing -- EventCode: 4673
$sharp_successor_execution.metadata.event_type = "SERVICE_UNSPECIFIED"
and (
$sharp_successor_execution.metadata.description = "A privileged service was called" and
$sharp_successor_execution.target.process.command_line = /SharpSuccessor/ nocase
)
)
// Capture the hostname where the event occurred
$sharp_successor_execution.principal.hostname = $hostname
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
metadata.description | eq |
|
principal.process.file.full_path | regex_match |
|
src.process.file.full_path | eq |
|
target.asset.software.description | eq |
|
target.process.command_line | regex_match |
|
target.process.file.full_path | regex_match |
|
Output fields
Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.
| Field | Source |
|---|---|
risk_score | 65 |
event_count | count_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.metadata.id) |
principal_process_pid | array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.pid) |
principal_process_command_line | array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.command_line) |
principal_process_file_sha256 | array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.file.sha256) |
principal_process_file_full_path | array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.file.full_path) |
principal_process_product_specific_process_id | array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.product_specific_process_id) |
principal_process_parent_process_product_specific_process_id | array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id) |
target_process_pid | array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.pid) |
target_process_command_line | array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.command_line) |
target_process_file_sha256 | array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.file.sha256) |
target_process_file_full_path | array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.file.full_path) |
target_process_product_specific_process_id | array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.product_specific_process_id) |
principal_user_userid | array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.user.userid) |