Detection rules › YARA-L

Hacktool - SharpSuccessor Execution

Severity
high
Type
alert
Time window
10m
Match by
hostname
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

SharpSuccessor is a .NET-based post-exploitation tool designed to weaponize the BadSuccessor attack discovered by Yuval Gordon (@YuG0rd) from Akamai. It allows a low-privileged user with 'CreateChild' permissions over any Organizational Unit (OU) in an Active Directory domain to escalate privileges to Domain Administrator. This detection rule identifies execution patterns or behavioral indicators linked to SharpSuccessor activity, which may signal privilege escalation attempts in Active Directory environments.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Privilege EscalationT1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

References

Event coverage

Rule body yaral

/*
 * Copyright 2025 Google LLC
 *
 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
 * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
 * You may obtain a copy of the License at
 *
 *     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
 *
 * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
 * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
 * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 * limitations under the License.
 */

rule hacktool_sharp_successor_execution {

  meta:
    author = "Georg Lauenstein - suresecure GmbH, Mohamed Abdelfattah - suresecure GmbH"
    description = "SharpSuccessor is a .NET-based post-exploitation tool designed to weaponize the BadSuccessor attack discovered by Yuval Gordon (@YuG0rd) from Akamai. It allows a low-privileged user with 'CreateChild' permissions over any Organizational Unit (OU) in an Active Directory domain to escalate privileges to Domain Administrator. This detection rule identifies execution patterns or behavioral indicators linked to SharpSuccessor activity, which may signal privilege escalation attempts in Active Directory environments."
    rule_id = "mr_be51aa7d-b4b8-4d8c-9998-0aa3194e98c3"
    rule_name = "Hacktool - SharpSuccessor Execution"
    tactic = "TA0004"
    technique = "T1068"
    references = "https://academy.bluraven.io/blog/detecting-badsuccessor, https://github.com/logangoins/SharpSuccessor"
    type = "alert"
    platform = "Windows, EDR"
    data_source = "Microsoft Sysmon, Windows Security Event Log, Microsoft Defender XDR"
    severity = "High"
    priority = "High"

  events:

    (
      $sharp_successor_execution.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
      and (
            $sharp_successor_execution.src.process.file.full_path = "SharpSuccessor.exe" nocase or
            $sharp_successor_execution.target.asset.software.description = "SharpSuccessor" nocase or
            $sharp_successor_execution.target.process.file.full_path = /\\SharpSuccessor\.exe/ nocase or
            $sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.file.full_path = /\\SharpSuccessor\.exe/ nocase or
            $sharp_successor_execution.target.process.command_line = /SharpSuccessor/ nocase
          )
    )
    or
    ( // Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing -- EventCode: 4673
      $sharp_successor_execution.metadata.event_type = "SERVICE_UNSPECIFIED"
      and (
            $sharp_successor_execution.metadata.description = "A privileged service was called" and
            $sharp_successor_execution.target.process.command_line = /SharpSuccessor/ nocase
          )
    )

    // Capture the hostname where the event occurred
    $sharp_successor_execution.principal.hostname = $hostname

  match:
    $hostname over 10m

  outcome:
    $risk_score = 65
    $event_count = count_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.metadata.id)
    $principal_process_pid = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.pid)
    $principal_process_command_line = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.command_line)
    $principal_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.file.sha256)
    $principal_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.file.full_path)
    $principal_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
    $principal_process_parent_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
    $target_process_pid = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.pid)
    $target_process_command_line = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.command_line)
    $target_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.file.sha256)
    $target_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.file.full_path)
    $target_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.product_specific_process_id)
    $principal_user_userid = array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.user.userid)

  condition:
      $sharp_successor_execution
}

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: match + condition

match:
    $hostname over 10m
condition:
    $sharp_successor_execution

Fires when at least one $sharp_successor_execution event in the 10m window.

Stage 1: events: $sharp_successor_execution · PROCESS_LAUNCH

(
  $sharp_successor_execution.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
  and (
        $sharp_successor_execution.src.process.file.full_path = "SharpSuccessor.exe" nocase or
        $sharp_successor_execution.target.asset.software.description = "SharpSuccessor" nocase or
        $sharp_successor_execution.target.process.file.full_path = /\\SharpSuccessor\.exe/ nocase or
        $sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.file.full_path = /\\SharpSuccessor\.exe/ nocase or
        $sharp_successor_execution.target.process.command_line = /SharpSuccessor/ nocase
      )
)
or
( // Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing -- EventCode: 4673
  $sharp_successor_execution.metadata.event_type = "SERVICE_UNSPECIFIED"
  and (
        $sharp_successor_execution.metadata.description = "A privileged service was called" and
        $sharp_successor_execution.target.process.command_line = /SharpSuccessor/ nocase
      )
)

// Capture the hostname where the event occurred
$sharp_successor_execution.principal.hostname = $hostname

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
metadata.descriptioneq
  • A privileged service was called
principal.process.file.full_pathregex_match
  • \SharpSuccessor.exe transforms: nocase
src.process.file.full_patheq
  • SharpSuccessor.exe transforms: nocase
target.asset.software.descriptioneq
  • SharpSuccessor transforms: nocase
target.process.command_lineregex_match
  • SharpSuccessor transforms: nocase
target.process.file.full_pathregex_match
  • \SharpSuccessor.exe transforms: nocase

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

FieldSource
risk_score65
event_countcount_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.metadata.id)
principal_process_pidarray_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.pid)
principal_process_command_linearray_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.command_line)
principal_process_file_sha256array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.file.sha256)
principal_process_file_full_patharray_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.file.full_path)
principal_process_product_specific_process_idarray_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.product_specific_process_id)
principal_process_parent_process_product_specific_process_idarray_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
target_process_pidarray_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.pid)
target_process_command_linearray_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.command_line)
target_process_file_sha256array_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.file.sha256)
target_process_file_full_patharray_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.file.full_path)
target_process_product_specific_process_idarray_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.target.process.product_specific_process_id)
principal_user_useridarray_distinct($sharp_successor_execution.principal.user.userid)