Detection rules › YARA-L

ADFS DB Suspicious Named Pipe Connection

Severity
medium
Type
alert
Time window
5m
Match by
hostname
Source
github.com/chronicle/detection-rules

Connection to ADFS via named pipes that are not using specific Windows ADFS processes may be indicative of user attempting to access ADFS for suspicious purposes

References

Event coverage

Rule body yaral

/*
 * Copyright 2023 Google LLC
 *
 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
 * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
 * You may obtain a copy of the License at
 *
 *     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
 *
 * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
 * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
 * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 * limitations under the License.
 */

rule adfs_db_suspicious_named_pipe_connection {

  meta:
    author = "Google Cloud Security"
    description = "Connection to ADFS via named pipes that are not using specific Windows ADFS processes may be indicative of user attempting to access ADFS for suspicious purposes"
    rule_id = "mr_a25913a1-65be-4cb5-b0de-6858dd04ac99"
    rule_name = "ADFS DB Suspicious Named Pipe Connection"
    reference = "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Windows%20Security%20Events/Analytic%20Rules/ADFSDBNamedPipeConnection.yaml"
    type = "alert"
    platform = "Windows"
    data_source = "sysmon"
    severity = "Medium"
    priority = "Medium"

 events:
   $process.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_UNCATEGORIZED"
   $process.metadata.product_event_type = "18"
   $process.metadata.product_name = "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
   not re.regex($process.target.process.file.full_path, `Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.PshSurrogate.exe|Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe|AzureADConnect.exe|Microsoft.Tri.Sensor.exe|wsmprovhost.exe|mmc.exe|sqlservr.exe|sqlwriter.exe`) nocase
   $process.target.resource.name = "\\MICROSOFT##WID\\tsql\\query" nocase
   /*
   If you have a listing of ADFS servers, you can use a reference list or enumerate them in the field below.
   Alternatively, if ADFS servers are grouped in an asset attribute, that attribute could be used instead.
   */
   $process.principal.hostname = /adfs/ nocase
   $process.principal.hostname = $hostname

 match:
   $hostname over 5m

 outcome:
    $risk_score = 65
    $event_count = count_distinct($process.metadata.id)
    $security_summary = array_distinct($process.security_result.summary)
    $target_process_parent_process_command_line = array_distinct($process.target.process.parent_process.command_line)
    //added to populate alert graph with additional context
    //Commented out because it is the same as the match variable, if match variable changes, uncomment to use
    //$principal_hostname = array_distinct($process.principal.hostname)
    $principal_user_userid = array_distinct($process.principal.user.userid)
    $target_process_pid = array_distinct($process.target.process.pid)
    $target_process_command_line = array_distinct($process.target.process.command_line)
    $target_process_file_sha256 = array_distinct($process.target.process.file.sha256)
    $target_process_file_full_path = array_distinct($process.target.process.file.full_path)
    $target_process_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($process.target.process.product_specific_process_id)
    $target_process_parent_product_specific_process_id = array_distinct($process.target.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
    $target_resource_name = array_distinct($process.target.resource.name)

 condition:
   $process
}

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: match + condition

match:
    $hostname over 5m
condition:
    $process

Fires when at least one $process event in the 5m window.

Stage 1: events: $process · PROCESS_UNCATEGORIZED

$process.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_UNCATEGORIZED"
$process.metadata.product_event_type = "18"
$process.metadata.product_name = "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
not re.regex($process.target.process.file.full_path, `Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.PshSurrogate.exe|Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe|AzureADConnect.exe|Microsoft.Tri.Sensor.exe|wsmprovhost.exe|mmc.exe|sqlservr.exe|sqlwriter.exe`) nocase
$process.target.resource.name = "\\MICROSOFT##WID\\tsql\\query" nocase
/*
If you have a listing of ADFS servers, you can use a reference list or enumerate them in the field below.
Alternatively, if ADFS servers are grouped in an asset attribute, that attribute could be used instead.
*/
$process.principal.hostname = /adfs/ nocase
$process.principal.hostname = $hostname

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

StageFieldKindExcluded values
1target.process.file.full_pathregex_matchMicrosoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.PshSurrogate.exe, Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe, AzureADConnect.exe, Microsoft.Tri.Sensor.exe, wsmprovhost.exe, mmc.exe, sqlservr.exe, sqlwriter.exe

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
metadata.product_event_typeeq
  • 18 corpus 6 (splunk 4, chronicle 1, kusto 1)
principal.hostnameregex_match
  • adfs transforms: nocase
target.resource.nameeq
  • \\MICROSOFT##WID\\tsql\\query transforms: nocase corpus 2 (chronicle 1, kusto 1)

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

FieldSource
risk_score65
event_countcount_distinct($process.metadata.id)
security_summaryarray_distinct($process.security_result.summary)
target_process_parent_process_command_linearray_distinct($process.target.process.parent_process.command_line)
principal_user_useridarray_distinct($process.principal.user.userid)
target_process_pidarray_distinct($process.target.process.pid)
target_process_command_linearray_distinct($process.target.process.command_line)
target_process_file_sha256array_distinct($process.target.process.file.sha256)
target_process_file_full_patharray_distinct($process.target.process.file.full_path)
target_process_product_specific_process_idarray_distinct($process.target.process.product_specific_process_id)
target_process_parent_product_specific_process_idarray_distinct($process.target.process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id)
target_resource_namearray_distinct($process.target.resource.name)