Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon › Event 13

Event ID 13 — RegistryEvent (Value Set)

Provider
Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon
Channel
Operational
Level
Informational
Collection Priority
Recommended (Palantir, others)
Task
Registry value set (rule: RegistryEvent)
Opcode
Info

Description

This Registry event type identifies Registry value modifications.

Message #

Registry value set:
RuleName: %1
EventType: %2
UtcTime: %3
ProcessGuid: %4
ProcessId: %5
Image: %6
TargetObject: %7
Details: %8
User: %9

Fields #

NameDescription
RuleName UnicodeString → stringCustom tag mapped to event, i.e. ATT&CK technique ID
EventType UnicodeString → stringRegistry value modification event
UtcTime UnicodeString → stringTime in UTC when event was created
ProcessGuid GUID → GUIDProcess GUID of the process that modified a registry value
ProcessId UInt32 → PIDProcess ID used by the OS to identify the process that modified a registry value
Image UnicodeString → stringFile path of the process that modified a registry value
TargetObject UnicodeString → stringComplete path of the registry key
Details UnicodeString → stringDetails added to the registry key
User UnicodeString → stringThe name of the account that modified a registry value.

Example Event #

{
  "system": {
    "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
    "guid": "5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9",
    "event_source_name": "",
    "event_id": 13,
    "version": 2,
    "level": 4,
    "task": 13,
    "opcode": 0,
    "keywords": 9223372036854775808,
    "time_created": "2023-11-06T02:04:35.731741+00:00",
    "event_record_id": 1441174,
    "correlation": {},
    "execution": {
      "process_id": 7064,
      "thread_id": 9788
    },
    "channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
    "computer": "WinDev2310Eval",
    "security": {
      "user_id": "S-1-5-18"
    }
  },
  "event_data": {
    "RuleName": "-",
    "EventType": "SetValue",
    "UtcTime": "2023-11-06 02:04:35.723",
    "ProcessGuid": "E56ADA26-2AFD-6548-9704-000000000D00",
    "ProcessId": 10860,
    "Image": "C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe",
    "TargetObject": "HKU\\S-1-5-21-1992711665-1655669231-58201500-1000\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\UserAssist\\{CEBFF5CD-ACE2-4F4F-9178-9926F41749EA}\\Count\\HRZR_PGYFRFFVBA",
    "Details": "Binary Data",
    "User": "WINDEV2310EVAL\\User"
  },
  "message": ""
}

Detection Patterns #

36 rules

Sigma

Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
Antonlovesdnb, Trent Liffick (@tliffick)
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
Show 26 more (29 total)
Dmitriy Lifanov, oscd.community
Mateusz Wydra, oscd.community
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poude (Nextron Systems)
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
Bartlomiej Czyz @bczyz1, oscd.community
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), @twjackomo, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
oscd.community, Dmitry Uchakin
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), wagga, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Splunk STRT)
Avneet Singh @v3t0_, oscd.community
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)

Splunk

Steven Dick, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Steven Dick, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Show 3 more (6 total)
Steven Dick, Bhavin Patel, Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Steven Dick, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
21 rules

Sigma

oscd.community, Dmitry Uchakin
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
Show 8 more (11 total)
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), wagga, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Splunk STRT)
Avneet Singh @v3t0_, oscd.community
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
Mateusz Wydra, oscd.community

Splunk

Steven Dick, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Show 6 more (9 total)
Steven Dick, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Steven Dick, Bhavin Patel, Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Steven Dick, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk, Steven Dick

Defense Evasion: Modify Registry

8 rules

Sigma

Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
Show 4 more (7 total)
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), wagga, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Splunk STRT)
Avneet Singh @v3t0_, oscd.community
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)

Detection Rules #

View all rules referencing this event →

Sigma # view in reference

Show 17 more (204 total)

Splunk # view in reference

  • Active Setup Registry Autostart source: The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to the Active Setup registry for persistence and privilege escalation. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the "StubPath" value within the "SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Active Setup\\Installed Components" path. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by malware, adware, and APTs to maintain persistence on compromised machines. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute code upon system startup, potentially leading to further system compromise and unauthorized access.
  • Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry source: The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to firewall rule registry settings that allow inbound traffic on specific ports with a public profile. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on registry paths and values indicative of such changes. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to grant remote access to a machine by modifying firewall rules. If confirmed malicious, this could enable unauthorized remote access, potentially leading to further exploitation, data exfiltration, or lateral movement within the network.
  • Allow Operation with Consent Admin source: The following analytic detects a registry modification that allows the 'Consent Admin' to perform operations requiring elevation without user consent or credentials. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the 'ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin' value within the Windows Policies System registry path. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, which could allow an attacker to execute high-privilege tasks without user approval. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized administrative access and control over the compromised machine, posing a severe security risk.
Show 17 more (160 total)
  • Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry source: The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification that enables auto admin logon on a host. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically looking for changes to the "AutoAdminLogon" value within the "SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon" registry path. This activity is significant because it was observed in BlackMatter ransomware attacks to maintain access after a safe mode reboot, facilitating further encryption. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to automatically log in and continue their operations, potentially leading to widespread network encryption and data loss.
  • Detect Remote Access Software Usage Registry source: The following analytic detects when a known remote access software is added to common persistence locations on a device within the environment. Adversaries use these utilities to retain remote access capabilities to the environment. Utilities in the lookup include AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, TeamViewer and much more. Review the lookup for the entire list and add any others.
  • Disable AMSI Through Registry source: The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by setting the "AmsiEnable" value to "0x00000000". This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Script\\Settings\\AmsiEnable". Disabling AMSI is significant as it is a common technique used by ransomware, Remote Access Trojans (RATs), and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) to evade detection and impair defenses. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute payloads with minimal alerts, leading to potential system compromise and data exfiltration.
  • Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry source: The following analytic detects the modification of Windows Defender registry settings to disable antivirus and antispyware protections. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with Windows Defender policies. This activity is significant because disabling antivirus protections is a common tactic used by adversaries to evade detection and maintain persistence on compromised systems. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to execute further malicious activities undetected, leading to potential data breaches, system compromise, and further propagation of malware within the network.
  • Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature source: The following analytic detects the modification of the Windows registry to disable the Windows Defender BlockAtFirstSeen feature. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path associated with Windows Defender SpyNet and the DisableBlockAtFirstSeen value. This activity is significant because disabling this feature can allow malicious files to bypass initial detection by Windows Defender, increasing the risk of malware infection. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to execute malicious code undetected, leading to potential system compromise and data breaches.
  • Disable Defender Enhanced Notification source: The following analytic detects the modification of the registry to disable Windows Defender's Enhanced Notification feature. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path associated with Windows Defender reporting. This activity is significant because disabling Enhanced Notifications can prevent users and administrators from receiving critical security alerts, potentially allowing malicious activities to go unnoticed. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable an attacker to bypass detection mechanisms, maintain persistence, and escalate their activities without triggering alerts.
  • Disable Defender MpEngine Registry source: The following analytic detects the modification of the Windows Defender MpEngine registry value, specifically setting MpEnablePus to 0x00000000. This detection leverages endpoint registry logs, focusing on changes within the path "*\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\MpEngine*". This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to disable key Windows Defender features, potentially allowing malware to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to undetected malware execution, persistence, and further system compromise. Immediate investigation and endpoint isolation are recommended.
  • Disable Defender Spynet Reporting source: The following analytic detects the modification of the registry to disable Windows Defender SpyNet reporting. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path associated with Windows Defender SpyNet settings. This activity is significant because disabling SpyNet reporting can prevent Windows Defender from sending telemetry data, potentially allowing malicious activities to go undetected. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable an attacker to evade detection, maintain persistence, and carry out further attacks without being flagged by Windows Defender.
  • Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature source: The following analytic detects the modification of the Windows registry to disable the Windows Defender Submit Samples Consent feature. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path associated with Windows Defender SpyNet and the SubmitSamplesConsent value set to 0x00000000. This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to bypass or evade detection by preventing Windows Defender from submitting samples for further analysis. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute malicious code without being detected by Windows Defender, leading to potential system compromise.
  • Disable ETW Through Registry source: The following analytic detects modifications to the registry that disable the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) feature. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\.NETFramework\\ETWEnabled" with a value set to "0x00000000". This activity is significant because disabling ETW can allow attackers to evade detection mechanisms, making it harder for security tools to monitor malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to execute payloads with minimal alerts, impairing defenses and potentially leading to further compromise of the system.
  • Disable Registry Tool source: The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry aimed at disabling the Registry Editor (regedit). It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\DisableRegistryTools" with a value of "0x00000001". This activity is significant because malware, such as RATs or trojans, often disable registry tools to prevent the removal of their entries, aiding in persistence and defense evasion. If confirmed malicious, this could hinder incident response efforts and allow the attacker to maintain control over the compromised system.
  • Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry source: The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification aimed at disabling security audit logs by adding a specific registry entry. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the "Control\\MiniNt" registry path. This activity is significant because it can prevent Windows from logging any events to the Security Log, effectively blinding security monitoring efforts. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow an attacker to operate undetected, making it difficult to trace their actions and compromising the integrity of security audits.
  • Disable Show Hidden Files source: The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable the display of hidden files. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with hidden file settings. This activity is significant because malware, such as worms and trojan spyware, often use hidden files to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to conceal malicious files on the system, making it harder for security tools and analysts to identify and remove the threat.
  • Disable UAC Remote Restriction source: The following analytic detects the modification of the registry to disable UAC remote restriction by setting the "LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy" value to "0x00000001". It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path "*\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System*". This activity is significant because disabling UAC remote restriction can allow an attacker to bypass User Account Control (UAC) protections, potentially leading to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could enable an attacker to execute unauthorized actions with elevated privileges, compromising the security of the affected system.
  • Disable Windows App Hotkeys source: The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification aimed at disabling Windows hotkeys for native applications. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on specific registry paths and values indicative of this behavior. This activity is significant as it can impair an analyst's ability to use essential tools like Task Manager and Command Prompt, hindering incident response efforts. If confirmed malicious, this technique can allow an attacker to maintain persistence and evade detection, complicating the remediation process.
  • Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring source: The following analytic identifies modifications in the registry to disable Windows Defender's real-time behavior monitoring. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with Windows Defender settings. This activity is significant because disabling real-time protection is a common tactic used by malware such as RATs, bots, or Trojans to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to execute code, escalate privileges, or persist in the environment without being detected by antivirus software.
  • Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection source: The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable SmartScreen protection. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with SmartScreen settings. This activity is significant because SmartScreen provides an early warning system against phishing and malware. Disabling it can indicate malicious intent, often seen in Remote Access Trojans (RATs) to evade detection while downloading additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to bypass security measures, increasing the risk of successful phishing attacks and malware infections.

Kusto Query Language # view in reference

  • DSRM Account Abuse source high: 'This query detects an abuse of the DSRM account in order to maintain persistence and access to the organization's Active Directory. Ref: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1785'
  • Registry Persistence via AppCert DLL Modification source medium: 'Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs Registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\ are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions CreateProcess, CreateProcessAsUser, CreateProcessWithLoginW, CreateProcessWithTokenW, or WinExec. Ref: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/009/'
  • Registry Persistence via AppInit DLLs Modification source medium: 'Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. Ref: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/010/'
Show 1 more (4 total)
  • WDigest downgrade attack source medium: 'When the WDigest Authentication protocol is enabled, plain text passwords are stored in the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) exposing them to theft. This setting will prevent WDigest from storing credentials in memory. Ref: https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/windows_7/2016-12-19/finding/V-72753'

References #