ATT&CK coverage › Technique

Lateral Tool Transfer `T1570`

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Once brought into the victim environment (i.e., Ingress Tool Transfer) files may then be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation.

Events covered

10 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

Provider	Event ID	Title
Sysmon	1	Process creation
Sysmon	5	Process terminated
Sysmon	11	FileCreate
Security-Auditing	4663	An attempt was made to access an object.
Security-Auditing	4688	A new process has been created.
Security-Auditing	4689	A process has exited.
Security-Auditing	4697	A service was installed in the system.
Security-Auditing	5136	A directory service object was modified.
Security-Auditing	5145	A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access.
Defender-DeviceFileEvents	9002000	File activity (any)

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 9 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. Field names are normalized across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (17 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

Field	Rules	How	Sample values
`Image`	3	`match` 2, `ends_with` 1	`Policies\\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}`, `Policies\\{6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9}`, `\\\\`, `\COMODO\Endpoint Manager\ITSMService.exe`
`CommandLine`	2	`match` 1, `eq` 1	`.bat`, `accepteula`, `rundll32`, `rundll32.exe`
`TargetFilename`	2	`ends_with` 2, `starts_with` 1	`.ps1`, `.pif`, `.exe`, `C:\Windows\PSEXEC-`, `.key`
`RelativeTargetName`	1	`ends_with` 1	`ScheduledTasks.xml`
`AttributeValue`	1	`match` 1	`CAB54552-DEEA-4691-817E-ED4A4D1AFC72`, `AADCED64-746C-4633-A97C-D61349046527`
`AccessList`	1	`match` 1	`%%4417`
`AttributeLDAPDisplayName`	1	`eq` 1	`gPCUserExtensionNames`, `gPCMachineExtensionNames`
`ShareName`	1	`wildcard` 1	`\\*\SYSVOL`
`EventID`	1	`eq` 1	`4688`
`Process`	1	`match` 1	`Policies\\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}`, `Policies\\{6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9}`
`FileCount`	1	`gt` 1	`4`
`Exe`	1	`gt` 1	`1`
`FileName`	1	`ends_with` 1	`.exe`
`ServiceFileName`	1	`regex_match` 1	`^%systemroot%\\[a-zA-Z]{8}\.exe$`
`ServiceName`	1	`regex_match` 1, `eq` 1	`(^[a-zA-Z]{4}$)\|(^[a-zA-Z]{8}$)\|(^[a-zA-Z]{16}$)`, `PSEXESVC`

Top indicator values (43 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules (here)	Corpus reach
`ShareName`	`wildcard`	`\\*\SYSVOL`	1	2
`AttributeLDAPDisplayName`	`eq`	`gPCMachineExtensionNames`	1	4
`AttributeValue`	`match`	`AADCED64-746C-4633-A97C-D61349046527`	1
`AttributeLDAPDisplayName`	`eq`	`gPCUserExtensionNames`	1	2
`AccessList`	`match`	`%%4417`	1	3
`AttributeValue`	`match`	`CAB54552-DEEA-4691-817E-ED4A4D1AFC72`	1
`RelativeTargetName`	`ends_with`	`ScheduledTasks.xml`	1
`EventID`	`eq`	`4688`	1
`Image`	`match`	`Policies\\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}`	1
`Image`	`match`	`Policies\\{6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9}`	1
`Process`	`match`	`Policies\\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}`	1
`Process`	`match`	`Policies\\{6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9}`	1
`FileName`	`ends_with`	`.exe`	1
`Exe`	`gt`	`1`	1
`CommandLine`	`match`	`.bat`	1	8
`FileCount`	`gt`	`4`	1
`CommandLine`	`match`	`accepteula`	1	3
`Image`	`match`	`\\\\`	1
`ServiceType`	`eq`	`0x10`	1
`ServiceName`	`eq`	`PSEXESVC`	1	2

Common exclusions (7 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations that rules under this technique routinely exclude (top-level not() clauses). These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules excluding
`Process`	`eq`	`known_processes`	2
`CommandLine`	`match`	`auditpol`	1
`CommandLine`	`match`	`rebootrequired`	1
`CommandLine`	`match`	`scripts`	1
`CommandLine`	`match`	`batch`	1
`CommandLine`	`match`	`script`	1
`CommandLine`	`match`	`illusive`	1

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Sigma 4 rules

Metasploit Or Impacket Service Installation Via SMB PsExec severity high, 1 event, 5 indicators, 0 exclusions
Potentially Suspicious File Creation by OpenEDR's ITSMService severity medium, 1 event, 16 indicators, 0 exclusions
PSEXEC Remote Execution File Artefact severity high, 1 event, 2 indicators, 0 exclusions
Rundll32 Execution Without Parameters severity high, 2 events, 2 indicators, 0 exclusions

Elastic 1 rule

Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO 2 events, 7 indicators, 0 exclusions

Kusto Query Language 4 rules

Identify Mango Sandstorm powershell commands 1 event, 0 indicators, 0 exclusions
New EXE deployed via Default Domain or Default Domain Controller Policies 1 event, 3 indicators, 1 exclusion
New EXE deployed via Default Domain or Default Domain Controller Policies (ASIM Version) 4 events, 2 indicators, 1 exclusion
Remote File Creation with PsExec 3 events, 6 indicators, 1 exclusion

Lateral Tool Transfer T1570