ATT&CK coverage › Technique

Hide Artifacts T1564

Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection.

Events covered

10 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

ProviderEvent IDTitle
Sysmon1Process creation
Sysmon4Sysmon service state changed
Sysmon5Process terminated
Sysmon11FileCreate
Sysmon13RegistryEvent (Value Set)
Sysmon16ServiceConfigurationChange
Sysmon255Error report: UtcTime: UtcTime ID: ID Description: Description.
Security-Auditing4688A new process has been created.
Security-Auditing4689A process has exited.
Security-Auditing4720A user account was created.

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 11 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. Field names are normalized across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (15 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
Image4ends_with 4, match 1\rundll32.exe, \pwsh.exe, \certutil.exe, \ProcessHacker_, \ProcessHacker.exe
CommandLine3match 3recycler, powershell, cscript, rundll32, controlvm
Description3eq 2, match 1Process Hacker, System Informer, Failed to open service configuration with error 93, Last error: The media is write protected., Failed to open service configuration with error 19
Product2eq 2Process Hacker, System Informer
Hashes2match 2SHA256=D4A0FE56316A2C45B9BA9AC1005363309A3EDC7ACF9E4DF64D..., SHA1=A0BDFAC3CE1880B32FF9B696458327CE352E3B1D, SHA1=C5E2018BF7C0F314FED4FD7FE7E69FA2E648359E, SHA1=8B12C6DA8FAC0D5E8AB999C31E5EA04AF32D53DC, SHA256=8EE9D84DE50803545937A63C686822388A3338497CDDB660D5...
OriginalFileName2eq 2ProcessHacker.exe, Process Hacker, SystemInformer.exe
TargetFilename2ends_with 2.cdmp, .camp, .gmmp, :\$Recycle.Bin.exe, .bat.exe
user1ends_with 1$
EventID1eq 14720
FileName1eq 1procList
Process1match 1procList
Details1eq 1DWORD (0x00000000)
TargetObject1match 1SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashControl
ParentImage1match 1:\Users\Public\
State1eq 1Stopped, Started

Top indicator values (72 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
userends_with$118
EventIDeq47201
ProcessmatchprocList1
CommandLinematchrecycler1
FileNameeqprocList1
TargetObjectmatchSYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashControl1
DetailseqDWORD (0x00000000)138
Imageends_with\cscript.exe164
CommandLinematchcscript112
ParentImagematch:\Users\Public\12
CommandLinematchrundll32119
CommandLinematchwscript112
CommandLinematchbitsadmin15
Imageends_with\wscript.exe164
CommandLinematchcertutil15
CommandLinematchpowershell116
CommandLinematchmshta111
Imageends_with\mshta.exe157
Imageends_with\bitsadmin.exe123
CommandLinematchregsvr32111

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Sigma 9 rules

Kusto Query Language 2 rules