ATT&CK coverage › Technique

Modify Authentication Process T1556

Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using Valid Accounts.

Events covered

2 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

ProviderEvent IDTitle
Sysmon13RegistryEvent (Value Set)
Security-Auditing5136A directory service object was modified.

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 4 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. Field names are normalized across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (6 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
AttributeLDAPDisplayName2eq 2msDS-KeyCredentialLink
Details2eq 1, in 1DWORD (0x00000000), 0x00000000, 0
AttributeValue1starts_with 1B\:828
TargetObject1ends_with 1\Control\Lsa\DsrmAdminLogonBehavior
EventType1eq 1modified, deleted
registry_path1in 1"*\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL", "*\\Lsa\\LsaCfgFlags", "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\DeviceGuard\\*"

Top indicator values (11 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
AttributeLDAPDisplayNameeqmsDS-KeyCredentialLink22
AttributeValuestarts_withB\:8281
DetailseqDWORD (0x00000000)138
TargetObjectends_with\Control\Lsa\DsrmAdminLogonBehavior1
Detailsin0x000000001
registry_pathin"*\\Lsa\\LsaCfgFlags"1
registry_pathin"*\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL"1
Detailsin01
EventTypeeqmodified15
registry_pathin"*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\DeviceGuard\\*"1
EventTypeeqdeleted18

Common exclusions (1 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations that rules under this technique routinely exclude (top-level not() clauses). These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
userstarts_withMSOL_1

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Sigma 2 rules

Elastic 1 rule

Splunk 1 rule