Credentials from Password Stores T1555
Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications and services that store passwords to make them easier for users to manage and maintain, such as password managers and cloud secrets vaults. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.
Events covered
13 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Sysmon | Event ID 7 | Image loaded |
| Sysmon | Event ID 8 | CreateRemoteThread |
| Sysmon | Event ID 11 | FileCreate |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4656 | A handle to an object was requested. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4663 | An attempt was made to access an object. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 5145 | A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 5382 | Vault credentials were read. |
| Defender-DeviceProcessEvents | ProcessCreated | Process created |
| PowerShell | Event ID 4103 | Payload Context: ContextInfo User Data: UserData. |
| PowerShell | Event ID 4104 | Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal). |
| PowerShell | Event ID 800 | Event ID 800 |
Authoring guide
Patterns shared across the 44 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.
Fields filtered most (39 distinct)
The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.
Top indicator values (309 distinct)
Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.
Exclusions (35 distinct)
Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.
Rules under this technique
Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.
Sigma 22 rules
- Access To Browser Credential Files By Uncommon Applications - Security
- Access to Browser Login Data
- Azure Active Directory Connect credentials dump via network share
- Credentials (protected by DPAPI) dump via network share
- DPAPI Backup Keys And Certificate Export Activity IOC
- Dump Credentials from Windows Credential Manager With PowerShell
- Enumerate Credentials from Windows Credential Manager With PowerShell
- HackTool - SecurityXploded Execution
- HackTool - WinPwn Execution
- HackTool - WinPwn Execution - ScriptBlock
- Potential Browser Data Stealing
- PUA - WebBrowserPassView Execution
- Remote Thread Created In KeePass.EXE
- SQLite Chromium Profile Data DB Access
- Suspicious Key Manager Access
- Suspicious Serv-U Process Pattern
- User application credentials dump via network share (DonPapi, Lazagne)
- User browser credentials dump via network share (DonPapi, Lazagne)
- User files dump via network share (DonPapi, Lazagne)
- Vault credentials manager accessed
- Vault credentials manager accessed
- Windows Credential Manager Access via VaultCmd
Elastic 7 rules
- Browser Process Spawned from an Unusual Parent
- Multiple Vault Web Credentials Read
- Potential Credential Access via Trusted Developer Utility
- Potential Veeam Credential Access Command
- Searching for Saved Credentials via VaultCmd
- Veeam Backup Library Loaded by Unusual Process
- Wireless Credential Dumping using Netsh Command
Splunk 12 rules
- Browser Credential File Accessed - Windows (Windows Event Log)
- Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir
- Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir
- Possible Browser Pass View Parameter
- Stored Credentials from Web Browsers - Windows (PowerShell)
- Windows Credentials Access via VaultCli Module
- Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Copied in TEMP Dir
- Windows Credentials from Password Stores Creation
- Windows Credentials from Password Stores Deletion
- Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query
- Windows Credentials from Web Browsers Saved in TEMP Folder
- Windows Password Managers Discovery