ATT&CK coverage › Technique

Event Triggered Execution `T1546`

Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons or other user activity such as running specific applications/binaries. Cloud environments may also support various functions and services that monitor and can be invoked in response to specific cloud events.

Events covered

14 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

Provider	Event ID	Title
Sysmon	1	Process creation
Sysmon	3	Network connection
Sysmon	11	FileCreate
Sysmon	13	RegistryEvent (Value Set)
Sysmon	23	FileDelete (File Delete archived)
Sysmon	26	FileDeleteDetected (File Delete logged)
Security-Auditing	4663	An attempt was made to access an object.
Security-Auditing	4688	A new process has been created.
Security-Auditing	5136	A directory service object was modified.
Security-Auditing	5156	The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a connection.
Defender-DeviceFileEvents	9002000	File activity (any)
Defender-DeviceNetworkEvents	9004000	Network activity (any)
Defender-DeviceNetworkEvents	9004001	Connection succeeded
WMI-Activity	21	WMI Events were bound.

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 15 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. Field names are normalized across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (24 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

Field	Rules	How	Sample values
`Image`	4	`ends_with` 3, `match` 1	`\outlook.exe`, `file_path1`, `file_path3`, `\reg.exe`
`TargetObject`	3	`ends_with` 2, `match` 1	`\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute`, `\Outlook\Security\Level`, `\Outlook\LoadMacroProviderOnBoot`
`TargetFilename`	3	`ends_with` 3	`\Microsoft\Outlook\VbaProject.OTM`, `Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\Get-Variable.exe`
`CommandLine`	2	`match` 2, `ends_with` 1	`reg add`, `reg_key`, `file_path2`, `regsvr32` , `.cpl`
`EventID`	2	`eq` 2	`4688`, `5136`
`Details`	2	`match` 2	`0x00000001`
`Provider_Name`	1	`eq` 1	`Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity`
`Consumer`	1	`match` 1	`subscription:ActiveScriptEventConsumer`, `subscription:CommandLineEventConsumer`
`Operation`	1	`eq` 1	`Created`
`process.Ext.api.parameters.consumer_type`	1	`in` 1	`ActiveScriptEventConsumer`, `CommandLineEventConsumer`
`data_stream.dataset`	1	`eq` 1	`windows.sysmon_operational`, `endpoint.events.api`
`process.Ext.api.name`	1	`eq` 1	`IWbemServices::PutInstance`
`EventData`	1	`match` 1	`reg add`, `reg_key`, `file_path2`
`parent_process_name`	1	`match` 1	`file_path1`, `file_path3`
`MD5`	1	`eq` 1	`SunburstMD5`, `SupernovaMD5`

Top indicator values (72 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules (here)	Corpus reach
`TargetFilename`	`ends_with`	`\Microsoft\Outlook\VbaProject.OTM`	2	2
`Image`	`ends_with`	`\outlook.exe`	2	16
`Details`	`match`	`0x00000001`	2	2
`process.Ext.api.parameters.consumer_type`	`in`	`ActiveScriptEventConsumer`	1
`Provider_Name`	`eq`	`Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity`	1
`Consumer`	`match`	`subscription:ActiveScriptEventConsumer`	1
`process.Ext.api.name`	`eq`	`IWbemServices::PutInstance`	1
`process.Ext.api.parameters.consumer_type`	`in`	`CommandLineEventConsumer`	1
`data_stream.dataset`	`eq`	`windows.sysmon_operational`	1
`data_stream.dataset`	`eq`	`endpoint.events.api`	1
`Consumer`	`match`	`subscription:CommandLineEventConsumer`	1
`Operation`	`eq`	`Created`	1
`EventData`	`match`	`file_path2`	1
`EventID`	`eq`	`4688`	1
`CommandLine`	`match`	`reg_key`	1
`CommandLine`	`match`	`file_path3`	1
`CommandLine`	`match`	`file_path1`	1
`EventData`	`match`	`file_path1`	1
`EventData`	`match`	`file_path3`	1
`EventData`	`match`	`reg_key`	1

Common exclusions (6 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations that rules under this technique routinely exclude (top-level not() clauses). These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules excluding
`aceType`	`in`	`OD`	1
`new_ace`	`eq`	`old_values`	1
`aceType`	`in`	`XD`	1
`aceType`	`in`	`denied`	1
`aceType`	`in`	`D`	1
`Details`	`eq`	`"(empty)"`	1

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Sigma 7 rules

COM Hijack via Sdclt severity high, 1 event, 1 indicator, 0 exclusions
Control Panel Items severity high, 1 event, 11 indicators, 0 exclusions
New Outlook Macro Created severity medium, 1 event, 2 indicators, 0 exclusions
Outlook Macro Execution Without Warning Setting Enabled severity high, 1 event, 2 indicators, 0 exclusions
Potential Persistence Via Outlook LoadMacroProviderOnBoot Setting severity high, 1 event, 2 indicators, 0 exclusions
Suspicious Get-Variable.exe Creation severity high, 1 event, 1 indicator, 0 exclusions
Suspicious Outlook Macro Created severity high, 1 event, 2 indicators, 0 exclusions

Event Triggered Execution T1546