ATT&CK coverage › Technique

Event Triggered Execution: Change Default File Association T1546.001

Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.

Events covered

4 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

ProviderEvent IDTitle
Sysmon1Process creation
Sysmon12RegistryEvent (Object create and delete)
Sysmon13RegistryEvent (Value Set)
Sysmon14RegistryEvent (Key and Value Rename)

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 6 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. Field names are normalized across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (7 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
Image3ends_with 3\cmd.exe, \reg.exe, \powershell.exe, \pwsh.exe
OriginalFileName3eq 3Cmd.Exe, reg.exe, powershell.exe, pwsh.dll
CommandLine3match 3.exe=exefile, assoc , exefile, assoc, sp
Details2match 2, eq 1(Empty), \Software\Classes\{, \Music\, \Contacts\, %tmp%
TargetObject2ends_with 1, match 1Classes\exefile\shell\open\command\(Default), Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute, Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\SymbolicLinkValue, \shell\open\command\
EventType1eq 1SetValue
registry_path1in 1, eq 1"*HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\*", "*\\shell\\open\\command\\*", "*HKCR\\*"

Top indicator values (43 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
Imageends_with\cmd.exe292
OriginalFileNameeqCmd.Exe232
CommandLinematchexefile1
CommandLinematch.exe=exefile1
CommandLinematchassoc 1
CommandLinematchassoc1
CommandLinematchSet-ItemProperty14
OriginalFileNameeqreg.exe129
Imageends_with\powershell.exe1143
Imageends_with\reg.exe146
CommandLinematch\ms-settings\shell\open\command1
CommandLinematchni 12
CommandLinematchadd116
CommandLinematchNew-ItemProperty14
CommandLinematchsp 12
Imageends_with\pwsh.exe1140
OriginalFileNameeqpowershell.exe18
OriginalFileNameeqpwsh.dll172
TargetObjectends_withClasses\ms-settings\shell\open\command\(Default)1
EventTypeeqSetValue13

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Sigma 5 rules

Splunk 1 rule