ATT&CK coverage › Technique
Domain or Tenant Policy Modification T1484
Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain or identity tenant to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in centrally managed environments. Such services provide a centralized means of managing identity resources such as devices and accounts, and often include configuration settings that may apply between domains or tenants such as trust relationships, identity syncing, or identity federation.
Events covered
2 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.
| Provider | Event ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | 5136 | A directory service object was modified. |
| Security-Auditing | 5145 | A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access. |
Authoring guide
Patterns shared across the 14 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. Field names are normalized across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.
Fields filtered most (12 distinct)
The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.
Top indicator values (64 distinct)
Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique.
Common exclusions (10 distinct)
Field/operator/value combinations that rules under this technique routinely exclude (top-level not() clauses). These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths.
Rules under this technique
Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.
Elastic 4 rules
- AdminSDHolder SDProp Exclusion Added
- Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition
- Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO
- Startup/Logon Script added to Group Policy Object
Splunk 10 rules
- Windows AD Dangerous Deny ACL Modification
- Windows AD Dangerous Group ACL Modification
- Windows AD Dangerous User ACL Modification
- Windows AD DCShadow Privileges ACL Addition
- Windows AD Domain Replication ACL Addition
- Windows AD Domain Root ACL Deletion
- Windows AD Domain Root ACL Modification
- Windows AD Hidden OU Creation
- Windows AD Object Owner Updated
- Windows AD Self DACL Assignment