ATT&CK coverage › Technique
Domain Trust Discovery T1482
Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain. Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting. Domain trusts can be enumerated using the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP. The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.
Events covered
10 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.
Authoring guide
Patterns shared across the 26 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. Field names are normalized across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.
Fields filtered most (20 distinct)
The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.
Top indicator values (824 distinct)
Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique.
Common exclusions (1 distinct)
Field/operator/value combinations that rules under this technique routinely exclude (top-level not() clauses). These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths.
Rules under this technique
Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.
Sigma 17 rules
- Active Directory Database Snapshot Via ADExplorer
- ADExplorer Writing Complete AD Snapshot Into .dat File
- BloodHound Collection Files
- DNS Server Discovery Via LDAP Query
- Domain Trust Discovery Via Dsquery
- HackTool - Bloodhound/Sharphound Execution
- HackTool - SharpView Execution
- HackTool - TruffleSnout Execution
- Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - PoshModule
- Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - ProcessCreation
- Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - ScriptBlock
- Nltest.EXE Execution
- Potential Active Directory Reconnaissance/Enumeration Via LDAP
- Potential Recon Activity Via Nltest.EXE
- PUA - AdFind Suspicious Execution
- Renamed AdFind Execution
- Suspicious Active Directory Database Snapshot Via ADExplorer
Elastic 1 rule
Splunk 5 rules
- Detect AzureHound File Modifications
- Detect SharpHound File Modifications
- Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block
- Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block
- Network Traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol