Exploitation for Stealth T1211

Adversaries may exploit vulnerabilities to evade detection by hiding activity, suppressing logging, or operating within trusted or unmonitored components.

Events covered

6 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 9 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (8 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
CommandLine5regex_match 4, contains 1(?i)conhost\.exe.*?\.exe, ^\S+\s, conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1, .bat, .bin
EventID3eq 34688, 1
Provider_Name3eq 3Application Error, Audit-CVE, Microsoft-Windows-Audit-CVE, Windows Error Reporting
Data2contains 2mpengine.dll, msmpeng.exe
Type2eq 2
EventType1eq 1FileRenamed
file_name1ends_with 1ext
parent_process_name1in 1excel.exe, outlook.exe, powerpnt.exe

Top indicator values (42 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
CommandLineregex_match
(?i)conhost\.exe.*?\.exe
22
CommandLineregex_match
^\S+\s
22
CommandLineregex_match
conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
22
Datacontains
mpengine.dll
22
Datacontains
msmpeng.exe
22
EventIDeq
4688
2312
CommandLinecontains
.bat
111
CommandLinecontains
.bin
1
CommandLinecontains
.cmd
16
CommandLinecontains
.cpl
15
CommandLinecontains
.dll
121
CommandLinecontains
.exe
15
CommandLinecontains
.hta
17
CommandLinecontains
.inf
13
CommandLinecontains
.jar
12
CommandLinecontains
.js
17
CommandLinecontains
.msh
1
CommandLinecontains
.msi
1
CommandLinecontains
.pl
12
CommandLinecontains
.ps
13
CommandLinecontains
.reg
14
CommandLinecontains
.scr
15
CommandLinecontains
.sh
12
CommandLinecontains
.vb
13
CommandLinecontains
.vbs
17
CommandLinecontains
c:\windows\fonts\
1
CommandLinecontains
cacls
1
CommandLinecontains
copy
15
CommandLinecontains
echo
15
CommandLinecontains
file createnew
12

Exclusions (1 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
PreviousFileNameends_with
ext
1

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Sigma 4 rules

Splunk 4 rules

Kusto 1 rule