ATT&CK coverage › Technique

Exploitation of Remote Services T1210

Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system.

Events covered

18 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

ProviderEvent IDTitle
Sysmon1Process creation
Sysmon19WmiEvent (WmiEventFilter activity detected)
Sysmon20WmiEvent (WmiEventConsumer activity detected)
Sysmon21WmiEvent (WmiEventConsumerToFilter activity detected)
Sysmon22DNSEvent (DNS query)
Security-Auditing4624An account was successfully logged on.
Security-Auditing4688A new process has been created.
Security-Auditing4697A service was installed in the system.
Security-Auditing4698A scheduled task was created.
Security-Auditing4699A scheduled task was deleted.
Security-Auditing4700A scheduled task was enabled.
Security-Auditing4701A scheduled task was disabled.
Security-Auditing4702A scheduled task was updated.
Security-Auditing4742A computer account was changed.
Security-Auditing5145A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access.
Defender-DeviceLogonEvents9003001Logon succeeded
Defender-DeviceProcessEvents9001000Process activity (any)
Audit-CVE1Possible detection of CVE: PossibleDetectionOfCVE.

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 11 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. Field names are normalized across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (13 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
EventID2in 1, eq 14702, 4699, 4700, 4742
Image2ends_with 2, is_null 1\QuickAssist.exe, :\Windows\System32\wininit.exe, :\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe, \rdpclip.exe
ParentCommandLine2match 2SysAidServer, \svchost.exe, termsvcs
Computer1eq 1ADFS_Servers
InitiatingProcessFileName1eq 1oracle.exe
HasInteractiveLogon1eq 10
ActionType1eq 1LogonSuccess
Provider_Name1eq 1Audit-CVE, Microsoft-Windows-Audit-CVE
QueryName1ends_with 1remoteassistance.support.services.microsoft.com
CommandLine1match 1 approve , /payload=, -PayloadFile
ParentImage1ends_with 1\javaw.exe, \java.exe
user1eq 1"ANONYMOUS LOGON"
PasswordLastSet1eq 1"*"

Top indicator values (37 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
EventIDin47011
EventIDin46991
EventIDin46971
ComputereqADFS_Servers1
EventIDin470212
EventIDin470012
EventIDin469812
InitiatingProcessFileNameeqoracle.exe1
ActionTypeeqLogonSuccess1
HasInteractiveLogoneq01
Provider_NameeqAudit-CVE1
Provider_NameeqMicrosoft-Windows-Audit-CVE1
QueryNameends_withremoteassistance.support.services.microsoft.com12
Imageends_with\QuickAssist.exe12
CommandLinematch check 1
CommandLinematch approve 1
CommandLinematch create 1
CommandLinematch delete 14
CommandLinematch /payload:1
CommandLinematch /updateid=1

Common exclusions (7 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations that rules under this technique routinely exclude (top-level not() clauses). These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
Accountends_with$1
FileNameinoradim.exe1
FileNameinconhost.exe1
CommandeqWhitelistedCmdlets1
usereqWhitelistedAccounts1
usercontains$1
usermatchwinrm va_1

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Sigma 5 rules

Splunk 1 rule

Kusto Query Language 5 rules