Exploitation of Remote Services T1210

Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system.

Events covered

28 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

ProviderEventTitle
SysmonEvent ID 1Process creation
SysmonEvent ID 3Network connection
SysmonEvent ID 11FileCreate
SysmonEvent ID 19WmiEvent (WmiEventFilter activity detected)
SysmonEvent ID 20WmiEvent (WmiEventConsumer activity detected)
SysmonEvent ID 21WmiEvent (WmiEventConsumerToFilter activity detected)
SysmonEvent ID 22DNSEvent (DNS query)
SysmonEvent ID 23FileDelete (File Delete archived)
SysmonEvent ID 26FileDeleteDetected (File Delete logged)
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4624An account was successfully logged on.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4625An account failed to log on.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4688A new process has been created.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4697A service was installed in the system.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4698A scheduled task was created.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4699A scheduled task was deleted.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4700A scheduled task was enabled.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4701A scheduled task was disabled.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4702A scheduled task was updated.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4724An attempt was made to reset an account's password.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4742A computer account was changed.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5145A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5154The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted an application or service to listen on a port for incoming connections.
Security-AuditingEvent ID 5156The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a connection.
Defender-DeviceLogonEventsLogonSuccessLogon succeeded
Defender-DeviceProcessEventsanyProcess activity (any)
Audit-CVEEvent ID 1Possible detection of CVE: PossibleDetectionOfCVE.
TermDDEvent ID 50Event ID 50
TermDDEvent ID 56Event ID 56

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 27 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (31 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
EventID9eq 9, in 24688, 4742, 1, 19, 20
CommandLine7contains 5, match 2 -inject , -payloadargs , -payloadfile , (?i)(cmd|powershell|pwsh)\.exe\s(\/Q)?\s(\/|-)c(ommand)?\s, (?i)(powershell|pwsh|cmd)\.exe\s(\/|-)c(ommand)?\s.+Windo...
parent_process_name7eq 5, match 2(?i)(wmiprvse|mmc|explorer|services)\.exe, (?i)svchost\.exe, UMService.exe, UMWorkerProcess.exe, dns.exe
event.type6eq 5, in 1start, creation, change, deletion
Image5ends_with 4, contains 1, is_null 1, starts_with 1:\windows\system32\csrss.exe, :\windows\system32\wininit.exe, :\windows\system32\winlogon.exe, ?:\windows\softwaredistribution\download\install\, \111.exe
Computer3eq 3ADFS_Servers, %domain_controllers%
ParentImage3ends_with 2, contains 1\cmd.exe, \java.exe, \javaw.exe, wmiprvse.exe
process_name3eq 3dns.exe, psexec64.exe, umservice.exe, umworkerprocess.exe
EventData2contains 2-encodedcommand, powershell.exe, powershell_ise.exe, rundll32, wmiprvse.exe
LogonType2eq 2Network
ParentCommandLine2contains 2\svchost.exe, sysaidserver, termsvcs
PasswordLastSet2eq 2*, -
Provider_Name2eq 2Audit-CVE, Microsoft-Windows-Audit-CVE, TermDD
TargetUserName2ends_with 1, eq 1$, AAAAAAA
Channel1eq 1, in 1

Top indicator values (135 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
event.typeeq
start
4241
EventIDeq
4688
3312
EventIDeq
4624
226
EventIDeq
4742
26
Computereq
ADFS_Servers
25
LogonTypeeq
Network
239
parent_process_namematch
(?i)(wmiprvse|mmc|explorer|services)\.exe
22
CommandLinecontains
-inject
1
CommandLinecontains
-payloadargs
1
CommandLinecontains
-payloadfile
1
CommandLinecontains
/payload:
1
CommandLinecontains
/payload=
1
CommandLinecontains
/updateid:
1
CommandLinecontains
/updateid=
1
CommandLinecontains
approve
1
CommandLinecontains
check
1
CommandLinecontains
create
13
CommandLinecontains
delete
15
CommandLinecontains
-c
14
CommandLinecontains
-encodedcommand
13
CommandLinecontains
/f
17
CommandLinecontains
/im
1
CommandLinecontains
@please_read_me@.txt
1
CommandLinecontains
administrator
1
CommandLinecontains
powershell
125
CommandLinecontains
rundll32
126
CommandLinecontains
taskkill
13
CommandLinematch
(?i)(cmd|powershell|pwsh)\.exe\s(\/Q)?\s(\/|-)c(ommand)?\s
1
CommandLinematch
(?i)(powershell|pwsh|cmd)\.exe\s(\/|-)c(ommand)?\s.+Windows\x5cTemp\x5c
1
CommandLinematch
(?i)cmd\.exe\s\/Q\s\/c\s
1

Exclusions (74 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
Accountends_with
$
2
Commandeq
WhitelistedCmdlets
1
CommandLinestarts_with
/c echo
1
EventDatacontains
gc_service.exe
1
EventDatacontains
gc_worker.exe
1
Imageends_with
:\windows\system32\csrss.exe
1
Imageends_with
:\windows\system32\wininit.exe
1
Imageends_with
:\windows\system32\winlogon.exe
1
Imageends_with
\rdpclip.exe
1
Imageeq
?:\windows\system32\conhost.exe
1
Imageeq
?:\windows\system32\werfault.exe
1
Imageeq
?:\windows\system32\wermgr.exe
1
Imagewildcard
?:\program files\microsoft\exchange server\bin\umworkerprocess.exe
1
Imagewildcard
?:\program files\microsoft\exchange server\v??\bin\umworkerprocess.exe
1
Imagewildcard
?:\windows\system32\conhost.exe
1

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Sigma 10 rules

Elastic 6 rules

Splunk 6 rules

Kusto 5 rules