ATT&CK coverage › Technique
User Execution: Malicious File T1204.002
An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.
Events covered
16 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.
Authoring guide
Patterns shared across the 34 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. Field names are normalized across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.
Fields filtered most (19 distinct)
The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.
Top indicator values (253 distinct)
Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique.
Common exclusions (6 distinct)
Field/operator/value combinations that rules under this technique routinely exclude (top-level not() clauses). These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths.
Rules under this technique
Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.
Sigma 23 rules
- AppLocker Prevented Application or Script from Running
- CLR DLL Loaded Via Office Applications
- DotNET Assembly DLL Loaded Via Office Application
- File With Uncommon Extension Created By An Office Application
- GAC DLL Loaded Via Office Applications
- HackTool - LittleCorporal Generated Maldoc Injection
- Microsoft Excel Add-In Loaded From Uncommon Location
- Microsoft VBA For Outlook Addin Loaded Via Outlook
- MMC Executing Files with Reversed Extensions Using RTLO Abuse
- New Application in AppCompat
- Potential Suspicious Browser Launch From Document Reader Process
- Remote DLL Load Via Rundll32.EXE
- Suspicious Binary In User Directory Spawned From Office Application
- Suspicious LNK Command-Line Padding with Whitespace Characters
- Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process
- Suspicious Outlook Child Process
- Suspicious Startup Folder Persistence
- Suspicious WMIC Execution Via Office Process
- Suspicious WmiPrvSE Child Process
- VBA DLL Loaded Via Office Application
- Windows AppX Deployment Full Trust Package Installation
- Windows AppX Deployment Unsigned Package Installation
- Windows MSIX Package Support Framework AI_STUBS Execution
Splunk 11 rules
- Batch File Write to System32
- Drop IcedID License dat
- Windows AppX Deployment Full Trust Package Installation
- Windows AppX Deployment Package Installation Success
- Windows AppX Deployment Unsigned Package Installation
- Windows Developer-Signed MSIX Package Installation
- Windows Explorer LNK Exploit Process Launch With Padding
- Windows Explorer.exe Spawning PowerShell or Cmd
- Windows MSIX Package Interaction
- Windows Suspect Process With Authentication Traffic
- Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File