Forced Authentication T1187
Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept.
Events covered
15 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Sysmon | Event ID 3 | Network connection |
| Sysmon | Event ID 11 | FileCreate |
| Sysmon | Event ID 22 | DNSEvent (DNS query) |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4624 | An account was successfully logged on. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4625 | An account failed to log on. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4662 | An operation was performed on an object. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4768 | A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 5136 | A directory service object was modified. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 5137 | A directory service object was created. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 5145 | A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 5156 | The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a connection. |
| Defender-DeviceLogonEvents | LogonSuccess | Logon succeeded |
| Defender-DeviceNetworkEvents | ConnectionSuccess | Connection succeeded |
Authoring guide
Patterns shared across the 21 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.
Fields filtered most (33 distinct)
The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.
Top indicator values (87 distinct)
Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.
Exclusions (4 distinct)
Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.
Rules under this technique
Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.
Sigma 7 rules
- Attempts of Kerberos Coercion Via DNS SPN Spoofing
- NTLM Hash Leak Via Curl NTLM Authentication
- PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request
- Possible PetitPotam Coerce Authentication Attempt
- Potential CVE-2026-33829 Exploitation - Windows Snipping Tool Remote File Path URI
- Suspicious Creation of .library-ms File — Potential CVE-2025-24054 Exploit
- Suspicious DNS Query Indicating Kerberos Coercion via DNS Object SPN Spoofing
Elastic 7 rules
- Potential Computer Account NTLM Relay Activity
- Potential Kerberos Coercion via DNS-Based SPN Spoofing
- Potential Kerberos Relay Attack against a Computer Account
- Potential Kerberos SPN Spoofing via Suspicious DNS Query
- Potential Local NTLM Relay via HTTP
- Potential Machine Account Relay Attack via SMB
- Potential NTLM Relay Attack against a Computer Account
Splunk 6 rules
- DNS Kerberos Coercion
- PetitPotam Network Share Access Request
- Windows Credential Target Information Structure in Commandline
- Windows Kerberos Coercion via DNS
- Windows Short Lived DNS Record
- Windows Theme File Creation in Unusual Location