ATT&CK coverage › Technique

Create Account: Local Account `T1136.001`

Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Events covered

20 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

Provider	Event ID	Title
Sysmon	1	Process creation
Sysmon	12	RegistryEvent (Object create and delete)
Sysmon	13	RegistryEvent (Value Set)
Sysmon	14	RegistryEvent (Key and Value Rename)
Security-Auditing	4688	A new process has been created.
Security-Auditing	4720	A user account was created.
Security-Auditing	4726	A user account was deleted.
Security-Auditing	4727	A security-enabled global group was created.
Security-Auditing	4730	A security-enabled global group was deleted.
Security-Auditing	4731	A security-enabled local group was created.
Security-Auditing	4732	A member was added to a security-enabled local group.
Security-Auditing	4737	A security-enabled global group was changed.
Security-Auditing	4744	A security-disabled local group was created.
Security-Auditing	4749	A security-disabled global group was created.
Security-Auditing	4754	A security-enabled universal group was created.
Security-Auditing	4756	A member was added to a security-enabled universal group.
Security-Auditing	4759	A security-disabled universal group was created.
Security-Auditing	4783	A basic application group was created.
Security-Auditing	4790	An LDAP query group was created.
PowerShell	4104	Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal).

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 15 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. Field names are normalized across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (13 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

Field	Rules	How	Sample values
`user`	4	`eq` 3, `ends_with` 1, `in` 1	`$`, `HomeGroupUser$`, `Administrators`, `"ESX Admins"`, `"ESX Admins"`
`EventID`	4	`eq` 2, `in` 2	`4720`, `4732`, `4727`, `4730`, `4737`
`Image`	3	`ends_with` 3	`\net.exe`, `\net1.exe`, `\lsass.exe`
`CommandLine`	3	`match` 3	`user`, `add`, `expires:never`, `Add-LocalGroupMember` , `/add`
`OriginalFileName`	2	`eq` 2	`net.exe`, `net1.exe`
`ScriptBlockText`	2	`match` 1, `eq` 1	`New-LocalUser`, `"New-ADGroup"`, `"ESX Admins"`, `"New-LocalGroup"`
`All_Changes.result_id`	2	`eq` 2	`4720`, `4726`
`TargetObject`	1	`match` 1, `ends_with` 1	`\SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\Users\Names\`, `$\(Default)`
`SamAccountName`	1	`match` 1	`ANONYMOUS`, `LOGON`
`distinct_eventcodes`	1	`gt` 1	`1`
`Group_Name`	1	`eq` 1	`Administrators`
`delete_result_id`	1	`eq` 1	`4726`
`create_result_id`	1	`eq` 1	`4720`

Top indicator values (67 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique.

Field	Kind	Value	Rules (here)	Corpus reach
`OriginalFileName`	`eq`	`net1.exe`	2	16
`CommandLine`	`match`	`add`	2	16
`Image`	`ends_with`	`\net.exe`	2	27
`OriginalFileName`	`eq`	`net.exe`	2	16
`Image`	`ends_with`	`\net1.exe`	2	25
`CommandLine`	`match`	`user`	2	4
`All_Changes.result_id`	`eq`	`4720`	2	2
`EventID`	`in`	`4727`	2	3
`TargetObject`	`match`	`\SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\Users\Names\`	1
`TargetObject`	`ends_with`	`$\(Default)`	1
`Image`	`ends_with`	`\lsass.exe`	1	5
`user`	`eq`	`HomeGroupUser$`	1	2
`user`	`ends_with`	`$`	1	18
`CommandLine`	`match`	`expires:never`	1
`ScriptBlockText`	`match`	`New-LocalUser`	1	2
`SamAccountName`	`match`	`ANONYMOUS`	1
`SamAccountName`	`match`	`LOGON`	1
`CommandLine`	`match`	`localgroup`	1	3
`CommandLine`	`match`	`/add`	1	5
`CommandLine`	`match`	`Add-LocalGroupMember`	1	3

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Sigma 8 rules

Creation of a Local Hidden User Account by Registry severity high, 3 events, 3 indicators, 0 exclusions
Hidden Local User Creation severity high, 1 event, 2 indicators, 0 exclusions
Local User Creation severity low, 1 event, 0 indicators, 0 exclusions
New User Created Via Net.EXE severity medium, 1 event, 6 indicators, 0 exclusions
New User Created Via Net.EXE With Never Expire Option severity high, 1 event, 7 indicators, 0 exclusions
PowerShell Create Local User severity medium, 1 event, 1 indicator, 0 exclusions
Suspicious Windows ANONYMOUS LOGON Local Account Created severity high, 1 event, 2 indicators, 0 exclusions
User Added to Remote Desktop Users Group severity high, 2 events, 7 indicators, 0 exclusions

Splunk 6 rules

Detect New Local Admin account 2 events, 5 indicators, 0 exclusions
Short Lived Windows Accounts 2 events, 4 indicators, 0 exclusions
Windows Create Local Account 1 event, 1 indicator, 0 exclusions
Windows ESX Admins Group Creation Security Event 3 events, 5 indicators, 0 exclusions
Windows ESX Admins Group Creation via PowerShell 1 event, 4 indicators, 0 exclusions
Windows Privileged Group Modification 9 events, 28 indicators, 0 exclusions

Kusto Query Language 1 rule

Powershell Empire Cmdlets Executed in Command Line 1 event, 0 indicators, 0 exclusions

Create Account: Local Account T1136.001