ATT&CK coverage › Technique

Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token T1134.002

Adversaries may create a new process with an existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Processes can be created with the token and resulting security context of another user using features such as <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code> and <code>runas</code>.

Events covered

6 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

ProviderEvent IDTitle
Sysmon1Process creation
Security-Auditing4624An account was successfully logged on.
Security-Auditing4688A new process has been created.
Security-Auditing4697A service was installed in the system.
Security-Auditing4703A user right was adjusted.
Service-Control-Manager7045A service was installed in the system.

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 9 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. Field names are normalized across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (19 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
CommandLine4match 4, ends_with 1.dll,a, cmd, %COMSPEC%, /WindowState 0, /CommandLine
EventType1eq 1logged-in
LogonProcessName1starts_with 1seclogo
process_name1eq 1svchost.exe
user.id1starts_with 1S-1-12-1-, S-1-5-21-
event.outcome1eq 1success
event.type1eq 1start
source.ip1eq 1::1
ServiceFileName1starts_with 1, match 1.dll,a, cmd, %COMSPEC%
ImagePath1match 1, starts_with 1.dll,a, cmd, %COMSPEC%
Provider_Name1eq 1Service Control Manager
ParentImage1ends_with 1\services.exe
OriginalFileName1eq 1AdvancedRun.exe
Image1ends_with 1\rundll32.exe
IntegrityLevel1eq 1S-1-16-16384, System

Top indicator values (68 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
user.idstarts_withS-1-12-1-1
EventTypeeqlogged-in17
event.typeeqstart1
event.outcomeeqsuccess18
user.idstarts_withS-1-5-21-1
LogonProcessNamestarts_withseclogo1
source.ipeq::11
process_nameeqsvchost.exe1
ServiceFileNamematchcmd15
ServiceFileNamematch%COMSPEC%12
ServiceFileNamematch/p:1
ServiceFileNamematchrundll3212
ServiceFileNamematchecho1
ServiceFileNamematch/c13
ServiceFileNamestarts_with\\\\127.0.0.1\\ADMIN$\1
ServiceFileNamematch\pipe\1
ServiceFileNamematch.dll,a1
ImagePathmatch/p:1
ImagePathmatchrundll3213
ImagePathmatch/c14

Common exclusions (5 distinct)

Field/operator/value combinations that rules under this technique routinely exclude (top-level not() clauses). These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths.

FieldKindValueRules excluding
process_namein"*\\System32\\lsass.exe*"1
process_namein"*\\SysWOW64\\lsass.exe*"1
process_namein"*\\Program File*"1
process_namein"*\\System32\\svchost.exe*"1
process_namein"*\\SysWOW64\\svchost.exe*"1

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Sigma 6 rules

Elastic 1 rule

Splunk 1 rule

Kusto Query Language 1 rule