System Information Discovery T1082
An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from Local Storage Discovery which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes.
Events covered
6 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4799 | A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. |
| Defender-DeviceProcessEvents | any | Process activity (any) |
| PowerShell | Event ID 4103 | Payload Context: ContextInfo User Data: UserData. |
| PowerShell | Event ID 4104 | Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal). |
Authoring guide
Patterns shared across the 64 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. The catalog normalizes field names across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.
Fields filtered most (27 distinct)
The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.
Top indicator values (339 distinct)
Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that use it.
Exclusions (42 distinct)
Field/operator/value combinations excluded by rules under this technique (top-level not() clauses), sorted by how many rules exclude each. These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths. Click a value to expand the rules under this technique that exclude it.
Rules under this technique
Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.
Sigma 18 rules
- Audit policy enumerated
- CMD Shell Output Redirect
- HackTool - PCHunter Execution
- HackTool - winPEAS Execution
- HackTool - WinPwn Execution
- HackTool - WinPwn Execution - ScriptBlock
- Network Reconnaissance Activity
- Potential Product Class Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE
- Potential Suspicious Activity Using SeCEdit
- PUA - System Informer Execution
- Suspicious Execution of Hostname
- Suspicious Execution of Systeminfo
- Suspicious Kernel Dump Using Dtrace
- Suspicious Query of MachineGUID
- System Disk And Volume Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE
- System Information Discovery via Registry Queries
- System Information Discovery Via Wmic.EXE
- Uncommon System Information Discovery Via Wmic.EXE
Elastic 7 rules
- Enumeration Command Spawned via WMIPrvSE
- Suspicious JetBrains TeamCity Child Process
- Suspicious MS Office Child Process
- Suspicious PDF Reader Child Process
- System Information Discovery via Windows Command Shell
- Windows System Information Discovery
- Wireless Credential Dumping using Netsh Command
Splunk 35 rules
- Common Recon Commands in Short Burst (Sysmon)
- Common Recon Commands in Short Burst (Windows Event Log)
- Common Reconnaissance Commands (PowerShell)
- Common Reconnaissance Commands (Sysmon)
- Common Reconnaissance Commands (Windows Event Log)
- Event Logs Queried for RDP Sessions (PowerShell)
- Event Logs Queried for RDP Sessions (Sysmon)
- Event Logs Queried for RDP Sessions (Windows Event Log)
- IcedID Discovery Commands (EDR)
- IcedID Discovery Commands (Sysmon)
- IcedID Discovery Commands (Windows Event Log)
- Potential PowerShell Post-Exploitation Activity (Sysmon)
- Potential PowerShell Post-Exploitation Activity (Windows Event Log)
- Potential Target Discovery via PowerShell Event Log Queries (PowerShell)
- SharpHound Enumeration (Windows Event Log)
- SharpHound Keywords (PowerShell)
- System Enumeration with WMIC (Sysmon)
- System Enumeration with WMIC (Windows Event Log)
- System Information Discovery - Windows (PowerShell)
- System Information Discovery - Windows (Sysmon)
- System Information Discovery - Windows (Windows Event Log)
- System Information Discovery Detection
- Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes
- Windows Information Discovery Fsutil
- Windows PowerShell Invoke-RestMethod IP Information Collection
- Windows PsTools Recon Usage
- Windows WinPEAS PowerShell Script Execution
- Windows Wmic CPU Discovery
- Windows Wmic DiskDrive Discovery
- Windows Wmic Memory Chip Discovery
- Windows Wmic Network Discovery
- Windows Wmic Systeminfo Discovery
- WMIC Host Reconniassance (PowerShell)
- WMIC Host Reconniassance (Sysmon)
- WMIC Host Reconniassance (Windows Event Log)
Kusto 2 rules
- Detect Suspicious Commands Initiated by Webserver Processes
- Powershell Empire Cmdlets Executed in Command Line