ATT&CK coverage › Technique

System Information Discovery T1082

An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from Local Storage Discovery which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes.

Events covered

4 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

ProviderEvent IDTitle
Sysmon1Process creation
Security-Auditing4688A new process has been created.
Defender-DeviceProcessEvents9001000Process activity (any)
PowerShell4104Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal).

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 19 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. Field names are normalized across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (13 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
CommandLine12match 11, contains 1, ends_with 1, eq 1ipconfig, wget, timeout, https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/releases/latest/download/, eventsinfo
Image12ends_with 12\reg.exe, \WMIC.exe, \PCHunter32.exe, \PCHunter64.exe, \winPEASx86_ofs.exe
OriginalFileName8eq 8wmic.exe, PCHunter.exe, winPEAS.exe, SeCEdit, SystemInformer.exe
Description3eq 3Epoolsoft Windows Information View Tools, System Informer, WMI Commandline Utility
Hashes2match 2IMPHASH=444D210CEA1FF8112F256A4997EED7FF, SHA1=3FB89787CB97D902780DA080545584D97FB1C2EB, SHA256=55F041BF4E78E9BFA6D4EE68BE40E496CE3A1353E1CA430659..., SHA1=8B12C6DA8FAC0D5E8AB999C31E5EA04AF32D53DC, SHA256=8EE9D84DE50803545937A63C686822388A3338497CDDB660D5...
ScriptBlockText2match 1, eq 1WinPwn , WinPwn.exe, WinPwn.ps1, "*ipinfo.io*", "*api.ipify.org*"
FileName1in 1cmd.exe, powershell.exe
ParentImage1starts_with 1, in 1httpd.exe, beasvc.exe, w3wp.exe
InitiatingProcessFileName1in 1, starts_with 1httpd.exe, beasvc.exe, w3wp.exe
ParentCommandLine1ends_with 1 -linpeas
Product1eq 1System Informer
dest_category1eq 1"web_server"
EventID1eq 14104

Top indicator values (120 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
OriginalFileNameeqwmic.exe333
Imageends_with\reg.exe246
Imageends_with\WMIC.exe212
CommandLinematchping14
ParentImageinbeasvc.exe1
InitiatingProcessFileNameinbeasvc.exe1
FileNameinpowershell.exe1
CommandLinecontains%temp%1
CommandLinematchcertutil15
CommandLinematchtimeout1
CommandLinematchwhoami1
ParentImagestarts_withtomcat1
InitiatingProcessFileNameinw3wp.exe1
FileNameincmd.exe1
InitiatingProcessFileNamestarts_withtomcat1
ParentImageinw3wp.exe1
CommandLinematchipconfig1
CommandLinematchwget12
InitiatingProcessFileNameinhttpd.exe1
ParentImageinhttpd.exe1

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Sigma 15 rules

Splunk 2 rules

Kusto Query Language 2 rules