ATT&CK coverage › Technique
Process Injection T1055
Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Events covered
12 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.
Authoring guide
Patterns shared across the 43 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. Field names are normalized across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.
Fields filtered most (23 distinct)
The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.
Top indicator values (360 distinct)
Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique.
Common exclusions (47 distinct)
Field/operator/value combinations that rules under this technique routinely exclude (top-level not() clauses). These are the false-positive paths the community has learned to filter out. A new rule that ignores the high-count entries here will likely fire on the same noisy paths.
Rules under this technique
Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.
Sigma 24 rules
- CobaltStrike Named Pipe
- CobaltStrike Named Pipe Pattern Regex
- CobaltStrike Named Pipe Patterns
- Created Files by Microsoft Sync Center
- Dllhost.EXE Execution Anomaly
- DotNet CLR DLL Loaded By Scripting Applications
- HackTool - CoercedPotato Execution
- HackTool - CoercedPotato Named Pipe Creation
- HackTool - DInjector PowerShell Cradle Execution
- HackTool - EfsPotato Named Pipe Creation
- Malicious Named Pipe Created
- Microsoft Sync Center Suspicious Network Connections
- Network Connection Initiated Via Notepad.EXE
- Potential DLL Sideloading Using Coregen.exe
- Potential Process Injection Via Msra.EXE
- PowerShell ShellCode
- Process Creation Using Sysnative Folder
- Rare Remote Thread Creation By Uncommon Source Image
- Remote Thread Creation By Uncommon Source Image
- Suspect Svchost Activity
- Suspicious Child Process Of Wermgr.EXE
- Suspicious Rundll32 Invoking Inline VBScript
- Suspicious Userinit Child Process
- Uncommon Svchost Command Line Parameter
Elastic 3 rules
- Process Injection by the Microsoft Build Engine
- Suspicious Process Access via Direct System Call
- Suspicious Process Creation CallTrace
Splunk 13 rules
- Create Remote Thread In Shell Application
- DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network
- GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network
- Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress
- Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process
- Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process
- Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser
- SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network
- Trickbot Named Pipe
- Windows PUA Named Pipe
- Windows RMM Named Pipe
- Windows Suspicious C2 Named Pipe
- Windows Suspicious Named Pipe