ATT&CK coverage › Technique

Process Injection: Thread Execution Hijacking T1055.003

Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Thread Execution Hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.

Events covered

2 catalog events are tagged with this technique by at least one rule.

ProviderEvent IDTitle
Sysmon8CreateRemoteThread
Sysmon10ProcessAccess

Authoring guide

Patterns shared across the 2 rules above: which fields they filter on, what specific values they look for, and what they exclude. Field names are normalized across vendors so Sigma's Image, Elastic's process.name, and Splunk's process_name collapse into one row. Each rule contributes at most once per row.

Fields filtered most (4 distinct)

The fields most rules look at when detecting this technique. The How column shows the operators authors use (eq, wildcard, regex_match, match) and how often each appears. Sample values are concrete examples to start from, not an exhaustive list.

FieldRulesHowSample values
Image2ends_with 1, eq 1, match 1\winword.exe, C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe, C:\Program..., unknown process
CallTrace1match 1UNKNOWN, :\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v2.
TargetImage1ends_with 1, eq 1\sethc.exe, \write.exe, \notepad.exe
StartFunction1eq 1EtwpNotificationThread, GetCommandLineW, LoadLibraryW

Top indicator values (25 distinct)

Specific (field, operator, value) combinations the rules check for, ranked by how many rules under this technique use each one. The Corpus reach column counts how many rules across the entire catalog (any technique) check the same combination. High numbers point to widely-used indicators that are likely noisy on their own; combine them with another condition for useful signal. Blank means the combination is specific to rules under this technique.

FieldKindValueRules (here)Corpus reach
Imageends_with\winword.exe117
CallTracematch:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v2.1
CallTracematchUNKNOWN12
Imagematchunknown process1
TargetImageeqC:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe1
TargetImageends_with\wordpad.exe12
TargetImageends_with\spoolsv.exe1
TargetImageeqC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1
ImageeqC:\Windows\System32\csrss.exe1
StartFunctioneqGetCommandLineW1
ImageeqC:\Program...1
TargetImageends_with\notepad.exe12
ImageeqC:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe12
TargetImageends_with\sethc.exe1
TargetImageends_with\mspaint.exe12
ImageeqC:\Windows\System32\explorer.exe1
TargetImageeqC:\Windows\System32\Sethc.exe1
TargetImageends_with\ping.exe12
StartFunctioneqEtwpNotificationThread1
TargetImageends_with\calculator.exe12

Rules under this technique

Every rule in the catalog tagged with this technique, grouped by vendor. Click a rule title for its full predicates, exclusions, and indicators.

Sigma 2 rules